

Ethical Hacking and Countermeasures Version 6



Module XX

Hacking Wireless Networks



Scenario

Clients of Xbrokerage Inc. are furious. None of them are able to logon to its portal. Xbrokerage had recently introduced this portal as an add-on service through which clients could track their shares and trade online.

Being a customer-friendly firm, Xbrokerage allowed wireless access within its office premises.

- Are wireless networks more prone to attacks?
- What could have been a vulnerable point?





Wi-fi users, beware

Hackers prowl public hot spots in order to steal your valuable data

By Joseph De Avila THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Monday, February 4, 2008

Next time you are sitting in a hotel lobby checking e-mail on your laptop, be careful: The "businessman" in the next lounge chair may be tracking your every move.

Many Wi-Fi users don't know that hackers posted at hot spots can steal personal information out of the air relatively easily. And savvy criminal hackers aren't settling for just access to credit cards, bank accounts and other personal financial information; they love to sneak into your company's network, too.

Whether you're using a Wi-Fi hot spot at a hotel, airport or cafe, "you've got to assume that anything you are doing is being monitored," said Shawn Henry, the deputy assistant director of the FBI's cybercrimes division.

Home Wi-Fi networks are vulnerable, too, but it is far more fruitful for a hacker to pitch his tent in a busy hotel lobby or convention-center lounge where he can collect data from dozens of users. And Wi-Fi hot spots have proliferated, multiplying the potential targets for hackers. There were 66,921 hot spots in the United States last year, up 56 percent from 2006, according to JiWire Inc, an advertising cmpany. T-Mobile USA Inc. has 8,700 hot spots across the nation in such places as Starbucks and Borders Books & Music. AT&T Inc. has 10,000 hot spots in such places as McDonald's, Barnes & Noble and Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf.

Henry said that businesses that offer Wi-Fi, such as hotels, often don't know that their networks have been breached and many times don't report incidents they know about for fear of bad publicity. Users are frequently unaware they have been hacked. As a result, there aren't solid figures on the number of wireless-hacking incidents. But the FBI for several years has received reports from educational institutions, private security companies, and other federal and local law-enforcement agencies about such attacks.

While the chances any one person will be hacked aren't high, the payoff for criminals can be great, said Tom Brennan, a manager for AccessIT Group, which assesses companies' security vulnerabilities.

In early 2006, when he was working for a different company, Brennan helped a financial institution determine how its data network had been breached. An employee working on a laptop in Midtown Manhattan's Bryant Park used what he thought was a publicly available Wi-Fi signal to get Internet access. But the signal he used had been set up by a hacker. When the employee reached his company's network, the hacker nabbed the employee's corporate user name and password.

Source: http://www.journalnow.com/





The Register » Security » Enterprise Security »

Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/18/cafe_latte_wi-fi_attack/

Cafe Latte attack steals credentials from Wi-Fi clients

By John Leyden Published Thursday 18th October 2007 18:40 GMT

Hackers have refined a new technique for breaking into Wi-Fi networks protected by the aging Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP).

The so-called 'Cafe Latte' attack aims to retrieve the WEP keys from the PCs of road warriors. The approach concentrates its attack on wireless clients, as opposed to earlier attacks that cracked the key on wireless networks after sniffing a sufficient amount of traffic on a network.

"At its core, the attack uses various behavioral characteristics of the Windows wireless stack along with already known flaws in WEP," explains Vivek Ramachandran, a security researcher at AirTight Networks, who will <u>demonstrate</u> (http://toorcon.org/2007/event.php?id=25) the approach at the Toorcon hacking conference in San Diego this weekend (19-21 October). "Depending upon the network configuration of the authorised network we will show that it is possible to recover the WEP key from an isolated Client within a time slot ranging between just a few minutes to a couple of hours."

Source: http://www.theregister.co.uk/

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Module Objective

This module will familiarize you with :

- Concept of Wireless Networking
- Effects of Wireless Attacks on Business
- Types of Wireless Networks
- Wireless Standards
- Antennas
- Wireless Access Points
- SSID
- Setting up a WLAN
- Detecting a Wireless Network
- How to Access a WLAN
- Wired Equivalent Privacy
- Wi-Fi Protected Access
- Steps for Hacking Wireless Networks
- Cracking WEP
- Tools for Scanning
- Tools for Sniffing
- Securing Wireless Networks
- WIDZ and RADIUS







Introduction to Wireless

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Introduction to Wireless Networking

Wireless networking technology is becoming increasingly popular and at the same time has introduced several security issues

The popularity of wireless technology is driven by two primary factors: convenience and cost

A Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) allows workers to access digital resources without being locked to their desks

Laptops can be carried to meetings, or even to Starbucks, and connected to a wireless network. This convenience has become more affordable





CEH Wired Network vs. Wireless Network

Wired networks offer more and better security options than wireless

More thoroughly established standards with wired networks

Wireless networks are much more equipment-dependent than wired networks

It is easier to implement security policies on wired networks





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Effects of Wireless Attacks on Business

As more and more firms adopt wireless networks, security becomes more crucial

Business is at high risk from whackers (wireless hackers) who do not require physical entry into a business network to hack, but can easily compromise the network with the help of freely available tools

Warchalking, Wardriving, and Warflying are some of the ways in which a whacker can assess the vulnerability of a firm's network









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Wireless Standards

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Wireless Standards



The first wireless standard was 802.11

It defines three physical layers:

- Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS)
- Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)
- Infrared

802.11a: More channels, high speed, and less interference

802.11b: Protocol of Wi-Fi revolution, de facto standard

802.11g: Similar to 802.11b, only faster

802.11i: Improves WLAN security

802.16: Long distance wireless infrastructure

Bluetooth: Cable replacement option

900 MHz: Low speed, coverage, and backward compatibility



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802.11a works at 40mhz in the 5g hz range

It's theoretical transfer rate is of up to 54 mpbs

It's actual transfer rates is of about 26.4 mbps It is limited in use because it is almost a line of sight transmittal that necessitates multiple WAPs (wireless access points)

It cannot operate in same range as 802.11b/g

It is absorbed more easily than other wireless implementations



WiFi operates at 20 MHz in the 2.4 GHz range

It is the most widely used and accepted form of wireless networking

It has theoretical speeds of upto 11 mbps

Actual speeds depend on implementation:

- 5.9 mbps when TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) is used (error checking)
- 7.1 mbps when UDP (User Datagram Protocol) is used (no error checking)

It can transmit upto 8 kms in the city

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Wireless Standard: 802.11b – "WiFi" (cont'd)

802.11b – "WiFi" is not as easily absorbed as 802.11a signal

It can cause or receive interference from:

- Microwave ovens (microwaves in general)
- Wireless telephones
- Other wireless appliances operating in the same frequency







802.11g operates at the same frequency range as 802.11b

It has theoretical throughput of 54 Mpbs

Actual transmission rate is dependent on several factors, but averages 24.7 mbps

Logical upgrade from 802.11b wireless networks – backwards compatibility

It suffers from same limitations as 802.11b network

System may suffer significant decrease in network speeds if network is not completely upgraded from 802.11b





802.11i is a standard for wireless local area networks that provides improved encryption for networks that use the popular 802.11a, 802.11b & 802.11g standards

The 802.11i standard was officially ratified by the IEEE in June, 2004

Security is made up of three factors:

- 802.1x for Authentication (EAP and Authentication Server)
- Robust Security Network (RSN) to keep track of associations
- Counter-Mode/CBC-Mac Protocol (CCMP) to provide confidentiality, integrity, and origin authentication





The 802.11n standard, which will be based on multiple-in/multiple out (MIMO) technology, is expected to boost throughput to potentially well over 100 Mbps









Wireless Concepts and Devices

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Related Technology and Carrier Networks

CDPD: Cellular Digital Packet Data (TDMA)

1xRTT on CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access): Mobile phone carrier networks

GPRS: General Packet Radio Service on GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications)

FRS (Family Radio Service) and GMRS (General Mobile Radio Service): Radio services

HPNA (Home Phone Networking Alliance) and Powerline Ethernet: Non-traditional networking protocols

802.1x: Port security for network communications

BSS (Basic Service Set): Access point ~ bridges wired and wireless network

IBSS (Independent Basic Service Set): Peer-to-peer or ad-hoc operation mode

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Antennas

Antennas are important for sending and receiving radio waves

They convert electrical impulses into radio waves and vice versa

There are two types of antennas:

- Omni-directional antennas
- Directional antennas

Can antennas are also popular in the wireless community and are used mostly for personal use









couseit | MoreAnswers | Cantenna Store

What is a Cantenna?

If you've never heard of a Cantenna, don't worry your not alone. A Cantenna is simply an inexpensive version of the long range antennas used by wireless internet providers and mobile phone companies. It is ideally suited for sending or receiving wireless signals in the 2.4 GHz ISM band (802.11b). Now, with your own Cantenna you can extend the range of your wireless network or connect to other wireless networks in your neighborhood.

FEATURES:

The Can

Our engineers have optimized can length and diameter for maximum signal strength and distance. Made from light-weight metal.

Connector (n-female) Connect to your Super Cantenna with industry standard cables and connectors.



Mounting Socket

Cantenna is designed with a socket for easy mounting on camera tripods and other mouting hardware.

Includes instructions and red plastic protection lid.





Above, a side-by-side photograph of the Super Cantenna and Pringles can is shown.



Increase the range of your wireless connection with the Super Cantenna. All Cantenna parts are engineered to be compatible with 802.11b Wireless Networks.

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Wireless Access Points



An access point is a piece of wireless communications hardware that creates a central point of wireless connectivity



Similar to a "hub," the access point is a common connection point for devices in a wireless network



Wireless access points must be deployed and managed in common areas of the campus, and they must be coordinated with telecommunications and network managers





The SSID is a unique identifier that wireless networking devices use to establish and maintain wireless connectivity

An SSID acts as a single shared identifier between access points and clients

Security concerns arise when the default values are not changed, as these units can be easily compromised

A non-secure access mode allows clients to connect to the access point using the configured SSID, a blank SSID, or an SSID configured as "any"





Beacon frames broadcast the SSID:

- Helps users to locate available networks
- Layer 2 management frames
- Networks without BFs are called "closed networks":
 - Simply means that the SSID is not broadcast anymore
 - Weak attempt at security through obscurity, to make the presence of the network less obvious
 - BSSIDs are revealed as soon as a single frame is sent by any member station
 - Mapping between SSIDs and BSSIDs is revealed by several management frames that are not encrypted





Stations looking for an access point send the SSID they are looking for in a "probe request"

Access points answer with a "probe reply" frame, which contains the SSID and BSSID pair

Stations wanting to become part of a BSS send an association request frame, which also contains the SSID/BSSID pair in cleartext:

• As do reassociation requests (see next slides) and their response

Therefore, the SSID remains secret only on closed networks with no activity

Closed networks are mainly inconvenient to legitimate users







The channel and service set identifier (SSID) must be configured when setting up a WLAN in addition to traditional network settings such as IP address and a subnet mask

The channel is a number between 1 and 11 (between 1 and 13 in Europe) and it designates the frequency on which the network will operate

The SSID is an alphanumeric string that differentiates networks operating on the same channel

It is essentially a configurable name that identifies an individual network. These settings are important factors when identifying WLANs and sniffing traffic







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Authentication Modes

Authentication is done by:

- A station providing the correct SSID
- Or, through "the shared key authentication:
 - Access point and all base stations share a secret encryption key which is:
 - Difficult to deploy

TM

Shical

- Difficult to change
- Difficult to keep secret
- No accountability
- A station encrypting with **WEP**; a challenge text provided by the access point
- An eavesdropper gaining both the plaintext and the cyphertext by:
- Performing a known plaintext attack
- This authentication which helps to crack WEP encryption







For 802.1X authentication to work on a wireless network, AP must be able to securely identify traffic from a particular wireless client

This identification is accomplished by using authentication keys that are sent to the AP and the wireless client from the RADIUS server

When a wireless client (802.1X supplicant) comes within the range of the AP (802.1X authenticator), the simplified process as given in the next slide occurs:

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The 802.1X Authentication Process (cont'd)

- The AP point issues a challenge to the wireless client
- The wireless client responds with its identity
- The AP forwards the identity to the RADIUS server using the uncontrolled port
- The RADIUS server sends a request to the wireless station via the AP specifying the authentication mechanism to be used
- The wireless station responds to the RADIUS server with its credentials via the AP
- The RADIUS server sends an encrypted authentication key to the AP if the credentials are acceptable
- The AP generates a multicast/global authentication key encrypted with a per-station unicast session key, and transmits it to the wireless station

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2

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WEP and WPA

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Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)

WEP is a component of the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standards

Its primary purpose is to provide confidentiality of the data on wireless networks at a level equivalent to wired LANs

Wired LANs typically employ physical controls to prevent unauthorized users from connecting to the network and viewing data

In a wireless LAN, the network can be accessed without physically connecting to the LAN

IEEE chose to employ encryption at the data link layer to prevent unauthorized eavesdropping on a network

• This is accomplished by encrypting data with the RC4 encryption algorithm



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Certified Ethical Hack

Wired Equivalent Privacy (cont'd)

Cryptographic mechanism is used to defend against threats

It is developed without :

- Academic or public review
- Review from cryptologists

It has significant vulnerabilities and design flaws

Only about a quarter to a third of wireless access points use WEP:

- Tam et al. 2002
- Hamilton 2002
- Pickard and Cracknell 2001, 2003




• How else can you call a protection that is 16.8 million times weaker than advertised?



CRC32 is not sufficient to ensure complete cryptographic integrity of a packet

• By capturing two packets, an attacker can reliably flip a bit in the encrypted stream, and modify the checksum so that the packet is accepted

IV's are 24 bits

• An AP broadcasting 1500 byte packets at 11 Mb/s would exhaust the entire IV Space in five hours

Known Plaintext Attacks

• When there is IV Collision, it becomes possible to reconstruct the RC4 keystream based on the IV and the decrypted payload of the packet





Dictionary Attacks

• WEP is based on a password

Denial of Services

• Associate and Disassociate messages are not authenticated

Eventually, an attacker can construct a decryption table of reconstructed key streams

• With about 24 GB of space, an attacker can use this table to decrypt WEP Packets in real-time







A lack of centralized key management makes it difficult to change WEP keys with any regularity

IV is a value that is used to randomize the key stream value and each packet has IV value

- The standard only allows 24 bits, which can be used within hours at a busy AP
- IV values will be reused

The standard does not dictate that each packet must have a unique IV, so vendors use only a small part of the available 24-bit possibilities

• A mechanism that depends on randomness is not random at all and attackers can easily figure out the key stream and decrypt other messages



When a wireless station wants to access a network, it sends a probe request packet on all channels so that any AP in range will respond

The AP responds with packets containing the AP's SSID and other network information

- When open system authentication (OSA) is configured, the station will send an authentication request to the AP and the AP will make an access decision based on its policy
- When shared key authentication (SKA) is configured, the AP will send a challenge to the station and the station encrypts it with its WEP key and sends it back to the AP
 - If the AP obtains the challenge value, the station is authorized

WEP - Shared Key Authentication

The Requesting Station sends the challenge text

The Receiving Station:

Ethical

- Decrypts the challenge using the same shared key
- Compares it to the challenge text sent earlier
- If they match, an acknowledgement is sent
- If they do not match, a negative authentication notice is sent

Once acknowledged, the transmission is sent



Receiving Station

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After the authentication phase, the station will send an association request packet to the AP

If the AP has a policy to allow this station to access the network, it will associate the station to itself by placing the station in its association table

A wireless device has to be associated with an AP to access network resources, and not just authenticated

The authentication and association phases authorize the device, and not the user

There is no way to know if an unauthorized user has stolen and is using an authorized device



Two basic flaws undermine its ability to protect against a serious attack:

No defined method for encryption key distribution

• Pre-shared keys were set once at installation and are rarely (if ever) changed

Use of RC4 which was designed to be a one-time cipher and not intended for multiple message use

- As the pre-shared key is rarely changed, the same key is used over and over
- An attacker monitors traffic and finds enough examples to work out the plaintext from message context and with knowledge of the ciphertext and plaintext, he/she can compute the key



WPA is not an official IEEE standard, but will be compatible with the upcoming 802.11i security standard

It (Wi-Fi Protected Access) is a data encryption method for 802.11 WLANs

It resolves the issue of weak WEP headers, which are called initialization vectors (IVs)

It is designed to be a software upgrade

With WPA, the rekeying of global encryption keys is required



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WEP is weak and fails to meet any of its goals



WPA fixes most of WEP's problems, but adds some new vulnerabilities



WPA2 is expected to make wireless networks as secure as wired networks





WPA2 is compatible with the 802.11i standard

It provides government grade security by implementing the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) FIPS 140-2 compliant AES encryption algorithm

It offers two modes of operation:



- Enterprise: Verifies network users through a server
- Personal: Protects unauthorized network access by utilizing a set-up password

WPA2 Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (cont'd)

Features:

- WPA2 authentication
- WPA2 key management
- Temporal Key management
- Michael Algorithm
- AES support
- Supporting a mixture of WPA and WEP wireless clients



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Attacks and Hacking Tools

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WarWalking – Walking around to look for open wireless networks

Wardriving – Driving around to look for open wireless networks

WarFlying – Flying around to look for open wireless networks

WarChalking - Using chalk to identify available open networks

Blue jacking – Temporarily hijacking another person's cell phone using Bluetooth technology

Global Positioning System (GPS) – It can be used to help map the open networks that are found





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let's ware	chalk!
KEY	SYMBOL
OPEN NODE	ssid South bandwidth
CLOSED NODE	ssid
WEP NODE	ssid bandwidth
blackbeltjo	nes.com/warchalking







Proposed New Signs



Unrestricted access



Open access with restrictions



AP with WEP



AP with closed ESSID



AP with MAC filtering



Pay for access AP



AP with multiple access controls (not for public use)



Honeypot







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Any station can impersonate another station or access point and attack or interfere with the authentication and association mechanisms:

• As these frames are not encrypted, the difficulty is trivial

Disassociation and deauthentication frames:

- A station receiving one of those frames must redo the authentication and association processes
- With a single short frame, an attacker can delay the transmission of data and require the station and real access point to redo these processes:
 - This takes several frames to perform







WEP attack takes at least 10,000 packets to discover the key

• A large amount of known data is the fastest way of determining as many key streams as possible

Wep Weggie (part of BSD-Airtools) can be used to generate a large number of small packets:

- The information may be as innocuous as the fields in the protocol header or the DNS name query
- Monitoring is passive and therefore undetectable
- Simple tools and instructions are readily available to recover the key





Passive attacks:

• The presence of the attacker does not change traffic, until WEP has been cracked

Active attacks:



- Active attacks increase the risk of being detected, but are more capable
- If an active attack is reasonable (i.e., the risk of detection is disregarded), the goal is to stimulate traffic:
 - Collects more pads and uses of weak IVs
 - Some attacks require only one pad



Some IVs can reveal information about the secret key depending upon how RC4 is used in WEP:

• Mathematical details out of the scope of this material

Attack

- FMS (Fluhrer et al. 2001) cryptographic attack on WEP
- Practicality demonstrated by Stubblefield et al. (2001)
- Collection of the first encrypted octet of several million packets
- Exploits:
 - WEPcrack (Rager 2001)
 - Airsnort (Bruestle et al. 2001)
- Key can be recovered within a second (after collecting the data)





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Problems with WEP's Key Stream and Reuse

Secret key never changes, only the initialization vectors

Initialization vectors are sent unencrypted

If two messages with the same initialization vector are intercepted it is possible to obtain the plaintext

Initialization vectors are commonly reused

Initialization vectors can be used up in less than 1 hour

Attackers can inject a known plaintext and re-capture the ciphertext

It leaves WEP susceptible to replay attacks





Certif	ied / Ethical Hacker	utomated WEP Crackers
	AiroPeek (Commercial)	• Easy-to-use, flexible, and sophisticated analyzer
	WEPCrack, AirSnort	• Implementations of the FMA attack
	NetStumbler	• This is a popular network discovery tool, with GPS support. It does not perform any cracking. A Mac OS equivalent is named "iStumbler"
	KisMAC	This is a Mac OS X tool for network discovery and cracking WEP with several different methods
	Kismet	• Swiss-army knife
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Works independently when z or y is the "plaintext," "pad", or "ciphertext"





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Given an IV and secret key, the stream of bytes (pad) produced is always the same:

• Pad XOR plaintext = ciphertext

If an IV is ever reused, then the pad is the same

Knowing all pads is equivalent to knowing the secret

Application to WEP:

- The pad is generated from the combination between the IV and the WEP key passed through RC4
- Knowing all pads is equivalent to knowing the 40 or 104-bit secret:
 - "Weak" IVs reveal additional information about the secret







WEP Tool: Aircrack

Aircrack is a 802.11 sniffer and WEP key cracker

It recovers 40-bit or 104-bit WEP key

It implements FMS attack with some new attacks

It supports Windows, Linux, and Mac OS

E	aircrack 2.1
	aircrack 2.1 - (C) 2004 Christophe Devine
	usage: aircrack <pcap filename(s)=""></pcap>
	5 : debug - specify beginning of the key 4 : bruteforce fudge factor (current: 2) 3 : packet MAC filter: 00:00:00:00:00 2 : WEP key length in bits, current: 128 1 : read IVs from a specified pcap file 0 : start cracking (with 0 WEP IVs)
	-> 1
	(note: you can drag'n drop pcap files over aircrack.exe)
	filename: as21.cap
-	Opening pcap file as21.cap Choosing first WEP-encrypted BSSID = 00:0C:41:AB:18:B7 Reading packets: total = 287690, usable = 136987



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Aircrack-ng is an 802.11 WEP and WPA-PSK keys cracking program which recovers keys when the data packets are captured

The features of Aircrack-ng are:

- Better documentation(wiki, manpages) and support
- More cards/drivers supported
- More OS and platforms supported
- WEP dictionary attack
- Improved cracking speed
- Optimizations, other improvements, and bug fixing





WEP Tool: AirSnort



AirSnort is a wireless LAN (WLAN) tool that recovers encryption keys on 802.11b WEP networks

It operates by passively monitoring transmissions and computing the encryption key when enough packets have been gathered

It runs under Linux, and requires that the wireless NIC be capable of rf monitor mode, and that it passes monitor mode packets up via the PF_PACKET interface



Source: http://airsnort.shmoo.com/



AirSnort: Screenshot 1

🕷 AirSnort								
<u>E</u> ile <u>E</u> dit Settings <u>H</u> elp				1.4 4.4111				
● scan	Network device	Device\{552C	5A49-62D3	3-4 💌 Refr	esh	40 bit crack	breadth: 3	3
O channel <mark>6</mark> 🖨	Driver type)WL-650		-		128 bit crac	k breadth: 2	2
C BSSID Name WI	EP Last Seen Last I	IV Chan	Packets	Encrypted	Interesting	Jnique PW:	Hex PW: A	SCII
00:A0:B0	Sun Nov 13 7B:14	4:82 1	493	135	0	135		
FF:FF:FF	Sun Nov 13 00:00):00	6	0	0 (כ		
00:07:40:-	Sun Nov 13 00:00):00	4	0	0 ()		
00:0F:66: Abadainadai Y	Sun Nov 13 00:00):00 6	6	0	0 (כ		
		Airs	Snort					
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• scan	Network device	ath1		✓ Ref	resh	40 bit crac	ck breadth:	3
O channel 9	Driver has		rine ee		12	128 bit cra	ack broadth	. 2 *
	Driver type	HOST AP/O	nnoco					
BSSID Name WEP	Last Seen Last	IV Chan	Packets	Encrypted	Interestin	g Unique	PW: Hex	PW: ASCI
00:03:2F suse Y	Sun Aug 13 20:20	D:9E 1	14144	13839	0	11238		
FF:FF:Ff	Sun Aug 13 ' 00:00	00:00	1	0	0	0		
S	art	(Stop]		Clear	1	
	an		Stop			Uledi		

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Ethical Hacker

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AirSnort: Screenshot 2

Channel 5 BSSID BSSID 00.06:25:7F:90:55 00.02:2D:8D:1F:DE FF:FF:FF:FF 00:02:2D:8D:1E:50 00:90:4B:21:45:88	Card Name linksys	type	Prism2 (v	vlan-ng)	~				100 1 2	1 m 20 A		-dooplega
BSSID 00:06:25:7F:90:55 00:02:2D:8D:1F:DE FF:FF:FF:FF:FF 00:02:2D:8D:1E:50 00:90:48:21:45:88	Name linksys	WEP			1.2				120 bit crack bri	eadth: 2		:_fingerpr:
00:06:25:7F 90:55 00:02:20:8D:1F:DE FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF 00:02:2D:8D:1E:50 00:90:4B:21:43:68	linksys		Last Seen	Last IV	Char	Packets	cryp	pt eresti	PW: Hex	PW: ASCI		st_forge.c
00.022D.8D.1F.DE FF.FF.FF.FF.FF 00.022D.8D.1E.50 00.904B.2143.68				00:00:00	1	50	0	0				./src/ec_v
FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF 00:02:2D:8D:1E:50 00:90:4B:21:43:68	Verizon Wi-Fi			00:00:00	1	77	0	0				interface
00:02:2D:8D:1E:50 00:90:4B:21:43:68				00:00:00	1	222	0	0				ses/ec_inte
00-90-4B-21-43-68	Verizon WI-FI			00:00:00	4	104	0	0				rface/ncurs
00.00.40.21.40.00	SurfandSip			00:00:00	11	3	0	0				s.c ./src/s
00:03:93:EB:F6:61	Apple Network eb/661			00:00:00	10	5	0	0				eface enif
00:80:C8:B0:0B:62	loki	Y		00:00:00	11	2	0	0				TAUCE_BUILT
00:09:5B:47:87:24	Wireless	Y		00:00:00	11	1	0	0				
00:02:2D:8A:14:69	Verizon Wi-Fi			00:00:00	1	18	0	0				
00:06:25:7B:66:D7	linksys1	Y		00:00:00	1	2	0	0				1.1.1.1.1.
00:50:F2:7A:FB:96	MSHOME			00:00:00	6	3	0	0				l/sbin
00.07.85 B4:10:9D	tsunami	Y		00.00.00	6	19	0	0			2	
00:06:25:6D EC:63	linksys			00:00:00	6	2	0	0				/lib/etter
00:06:25:8D:BE:6F	faithexchange	Y		AA:AA:03	10	11	3	0				
00:04:5A:2F:DA:A3		Y		00.00.00	9	7	0	0				
00:30:F1:10:1C:02	FAITHEXCHANGE			00:00:00	2	12	0	0				em
00:40:05:C8:19:60	default			00:00:00	6	2	0	0				
00:0C:CE:1D:13:14	tsunami	Y		00:00:00	6	2	0	0				
00:05:5D:25:64:46	default			00:00:00	6	10	0	0				
00:80:C8:AD:00:F8	default	Y		00:00:00	6	2	0	0				
00:50:18:0C:D4:A2	www.valmandel.com	Y		00:00:00	10	6	0	0				
00:08:25:86:50:F5		Y		EB:80:DF	10	1	1	0				
00:40:05:BE:8D:0B				00:00:00	6	6	0	0				
00:40:96:58:AF:7D	gbeairlan			00:00:00	6	34	0	0				
52:66:14:8A:D6:97	hp			00:00:00	6	4	0	0				
00:40:96:56:62:51	abeairlan			00:00:00	6	24	0	0				
00:40:96:56:39:72	gbeairtan			00:00:00	6	75	0	0				
00:09:5B:40:66:27	WASOSLTDNY			00:00:00	6	3	0	0				
00:40:96:56:59:08	gbeairlan			00:00:00	6	38	0	0				
00:40:05:DE:60:EA	default			00.00.00	6	1	0	0				
00:40:05:0F:79:FB	WSAY			00:00:00	6	5	0	0				
00:40:96:58:85:EA	tmobile			00:00:00	1	4	0	0				
00:02:8A:0E:31:42	VED AUCT			00:00:00	8	21	0	0				
00:60:1D:F0:D7 BA				00:00:00	3	4	0	0				
00-08-25-C3-00-E1	linkenie			00.00.00	7	85	n					
	Shad		-	Ston	1			1	Name		1.5	

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WEPCrack is an open source tool for breaking 802.11 WEP secret keys

This tool is an implementation of the attack described by Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir in the paper "*Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4*"

While AirSnort has captured the media attention, WEPCrack was the first publicly available code that demonstrated the above attack

The current tools are Perl-based and are composed of the following scripts:

- WeakIVGen.pl
- prism-getIV.pl
- WEPCrack.pl



Source: wepcrack.sourceforge.net

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Ethical Hacker

Certified

CEH WEPCrack: Screenshot

300	Default	e
lew Bookmarks Configure	Customize Close	
Network: 00-30-bd-c0-	epcrack 1.1.0 by Johnny Cache 38-9a KeySize: 40 Status Running I	
Total Run Time: Od Oh Chunksize: 30 Chunks Percent Complete: 0.0	Om 15s Total Compute Time: Od Oh Om Os s currently out: O Current Stragglers: O 0000 Straggler Threshold: Od 2h Om Os	
Next iKey: 00:00:00:0	0:00:	
Total KeyChunks: KeyChunks checked out KeyChunks checked in:	04:00: 00:00: 00:00:	

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WepLab is a tool designed to teach how WEP works, what different vulnerabilities it has, and how they can be used in practice to break a WEP protected wireless network

WepLab acts as a WEP Security Analyzer and a WEP Key Cracker

WepLab tries to break the WEP key using several known attacks:

- Bruteforce
- Dictionary
- Statistical attacks

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WepLab starting to crack a pcap file by a statistical attack

	txipi@proton: /home/txipi/projects/wifi	1.00	х
txipi@proto weplab - We Jose Ignaci	n:-/projects/wifi\$ weplab-0.1.3/weplab -r captura.pcap p Key Cracker Wep Key Cracker (v0.1.3). o Sanchez Martin - Topo[LB] <topolb@users.sourceforge.net></topolb@users.sourceforge.net>		
Not BSSID s Detected o	pecified. ne packet with BSSID: [00:90:D1:01:69:7E]		
Total valid Total packe	packets read: 20187 ts read: 55345		
55345 Weak Statistical	packets gathered: cracking started! Please hit enter to get statistics.		
L.			-

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WepLab showing progress information in a statistical attack

🔻 🕫 🔄 txipi@proton: /home/txipi/proje	cts/wifi 📄 = 🗆 🚬
Total valid packets read: 20187	
Totat packets Tead. 55545	
55345 Weak packets gathered:	
Statistical cracking started! Please hit enter to get stati	stics.
1016576 keys tested	
4297 branch taken	
17230 c/s	
72 b/s	
Key: 66:a1:20:ef:ff	
Key: 00:00:00:00:00 Attack 2 current unche state 0 (1) tate 1 (2) tate 2 (2) ta	
Attack 1 current weaks (byte 0 (1), byte 1 (3), byte 2 (2), by	te 3 (1) , byte 4 (0) ,
Attack 2 current weaks (byte 0 (0), byte 1 (0), byte 2 (0), by	te 3 (0) , byte 4 (0) ,
Attack 10 current weaks (byte 0 (3) byte 1 (0), byte 2 (1), by	vte = 3 (0) byte 4 (0)
Attack 11 current weaks :byte 0 (0),byte 1 (0),byte 2 (0),b	vte 3 (0) , byte 4 (0) .
Attack 12 current weaks :byte 0 (1).byte 1 (0).byte 2 (0).b	vte 3 (2), byte 4 (0).
Attack 13 current weaks :byte 0 (0),byte 1 (2),byte 2 (0),b	vte 3 (0), byte 4 (0),
Attack 17 current weaks :byte 0 (116),byte 1 (116),byte 2 (114),byte 3 (62),byte
4 (0),	

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WepLab showing analyzing process information of a pcap file

🔻 🛥 🖕 txipi@proton: /home/txipi/projects/wifi 🔰 💷 🗆	X
<pre>txipi@proton:-/projects/wifi\$ weplab-0.1.3/weplab -a captura.pcap weplab - Wep Key Cracker Wep Key Cracker (v0.1.3). Jose Ignacio Sanchez Martin - Topo[LB] <topolb@users.sourceforge.net></topolb@users.sourceforge.net></pre>	
<pre>Statistics for packets that belong to [00:90:D1:01:69:7E]</pre>	

Certified Ethical Hacker Attacking WPA Encrypted Networks

WPA utilizes a 256-bit pre-shared key or a passphrase that can vary in length from eight to sixty-three bytes

Short passphrase-based keys (less than 20 bytes) are vulnerable to the offline dictionary attack

The pre-shared key that is used to set up the WPA encryption can be captured during the initial communication between the access point and the client card

After capturing pre-shared key, it is easy to "guess" the WPA key using the same concepts that are used in any password dictionary attack

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WEPCrack is a set of Open Source PERL scripts intended to break 802.11 WEP secret keys

Cygwin is a Linux-like environment for Windows that consists of a DLL (cygwin1.dll)

- "	_ 🗆 🗵
15 255 245 223 15 255 246 175 15 255 247 Ø 15 255 248 213 15 255 249 191 15 255 250 53 15 255 251 232 15 255 252 91 15 255 253 59 15 255 254 78 15 255 255 213	
bbarberENBOTI04? ~ \$ uname =a CYGVIN_NT-5.0 NBOTI049 1.3.22(0.78/3/2) 2003-03-18 09:20 i686 unknown unknow gwin	vn Cy
bbarber@NBOTT049 ~ \$ perl /tmp/WEPCrack.pl Keysize - 13 [104 bits] 8 0 3 0 0 13 8 0 8 0 0 0 bbarber@NBOTT049 ~ \$	

Executing WEPCrack.pl in Cygwin





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Attacking WEP with WEPCrack on Windows using PERL Interpreter

ActiveState ActivePerl (www.activestate.com), provides a robust PERL development environment that is native to Windows

WEPCrack was written so that it could be ported to any platform that has a PERL interpreter without modification

IS 255 238 42 15 255 239 219 15 255 240 153 15 255 241 63 15 255 242 163 15 255 243 215 15 255 244 111 15 255 244 111 15 255 244 175 15 255 247 0 15 255 247 0 15 255 249 191 15 255 250 53 15 255 251 232 15 255 252 91 15 255 253 59 15 255 255 213 C:\>perl \cygwin\tmp\WEPCrack.pl Keysize - 13 [104	
Keysìze - 13 [104 hìts] 8 0 3 0 0 13 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 C:∖>	-
Executing WEPCrack.pl at the Wind	dows Command Prompt All Rights Reserved. Reproduction is Strictly Prohibit



Wepdecrypt is a Wireless LAN Tool

It guesses the WEP keys based on the active dictionary attack, key generator, and distributed network attack

It implements packet filters

It starts cracking with only one crypted packet

It has its own key generator

A dumpfile can be cracked over a network

It can act as both server and client



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GWepDecrypt	-	
<u>File</u> Help		11 14
/home/iceman/WepDecrypt/k	Kismet-Ma	y-19-2
□ [Word File		
🗆 Mac Filter	₽ 64	•
□ Client Mode	□ [Num	Bloc▼
🔽 numeric 💽	₽ 1	•
First Key Last K	ey	
- WepDecrypt Gui -		-
- WepDecrypt Gui - Processing		-
- WepDecrypt Gui - Processing Extraction of necessary data v	was succe	
- WepDecrypt Gui - Processing Extraction of necessary data v Founded BSSID:	was succe	ssfu
 WepDecrypt Gui - Processing Extraction of necessary data v Founded BSSID: 1) 00 0C 41 9D 72 06 / Key 2 2) 00 80 5A 28 E2 C3 / Key 0 	was succe	ssfu
 WepDecrypt Gui - Processing Extraction of necessary data v Founded BSSID: 1) 00 0C 41 9D 72 06 / Key 2 2) 00 80 5A 28 E2 C3 / Key 0 1 network loaded 	was succe	ssfu
 WepDecrypt Gui - Processing Extraction of necessary data v Founded BSSID: 1) 00 0C 41 9D 72 06 / Key 2 2) 00 80 5A 28 E2 C3 / Key 0 1 network loaded Accepting wordlist data 	was succe	ssfu

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CowPatty tool is used as a brute force tool for cracking WPA-PSK, considered the "New WEP" for home Wireless Security

This program simply tries a bunch of different options from a dictionary file to see if one ends up matching what is defined as the Pre-Shared Key

Calculating PMK for "abc123abc123".	2
7814 69bf 213b 11e2 6233 7001 f06a 5809 x.i.!:b3piX	
alb6 4f75 ed9b d6fe 2c42 8fbc 781d 47d50u,Bx.G.	
Calculating PTK with collected data and PMK.	
Calculated PTK for "abc123abc123" is	
e339 644d 2d34 d1fe 0e44 36de a031 e007 .9dM-4D61	
7a04 d6f9 ef2a 582e df9d e32e 2b67 351e z*X+g5.	
c6ff e6dc 08cc 14de a62f e388 3a4c 4e65/:LNe	
7a92 c646 1763 0cb9 494b 73fd 61d7 fad4 zF.cIKs.a	
Calculating hmac-MD5 Key MIC for this frame.	
Calculated MIC with "abc123abc123" is	
3d1b bbf0 c4ae bacd dcb6 75d3 efb2 5f66 =uf	
The PSK is addizoaddizo .	
20 massnhrases tested in 1 89 seconds: 10 60 massnhrases/second	
prospirate centra in 1100 secondor 10100 passpirates/second	





Evil twin is a home-made wireless access point which masquerades as a legitimate one to gather personal or corporate information without the end-user's knowledge

Attacker positions himself in the vicinity of a legitimate Wi-Fi access point and lets his computer discover what name and radio frequency the legitimate access point uses



Attacker then sends out his own radio signal, using the same name

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Rogue Access Points

A rogue/unauthorized access point is one that is not authorized for operation by a particular firm or network

Tools that can detect rogue/unauthorized access points include NetStumbler and MiniStumbler

The two basic methods for locating rogue access points are:

- Beaconing/requesting a beacon
- Network sniffing: Looking for packets in the air



Tools to Generate Rogue Access Points: Fake AP

Fake AP provides the means of hiding in plain sight, making it unlikely for an organization to be discovered

It confuses Wardrivers, NetStumblers, Script Kiddies, and other undesirables

Black Alchemy's Fake AP generates thousands of counterfeit 802.11b access points

It is a proof of concept released under the GPL

It runs on Linux and BSD versions



Source: http://www.blackalchemy.to/

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CEH Fake AP: Screenshot

	root@	wireles	sdefence:/tools/wifi/fakeap-0.3.2
<u>F</u> ile <u>E</u> dit <u>V</u> ie	ew <u>T</u> erminal	Ta <u>b</u> s	Help
Copyright (c) 2002 Bla	ck Alc	chemy Enterprises. All rights reserved 📃 🖻
Usage: fakea [essi [wep	p.plint d NAME] [- N] [key	erface -words KEY] [e wlanX [channel X] [mac XX:XX] FILENAME] [sleep N] [vendors FILENAME] [power N]
chann essid mac X words sleep vendo wep N key K power	el X U NAME U X:XX U FILE U N S r FILE U EY U N V	se sta se sta se FII leep M se FII se WEP se KEY ary Tx	<pre>tic channel X tic ESSID NAME tic MAC address XX: E to create ESSIDs V Ssec between changes, default 0.25 E to define vendor MAC prefixes P with probability N where 0 < N <= 1 V as the WEP key. Passed raw to iwconfig c power between 1 and N. In milliwatts</pre>
[root@wirele	ssdefence	fakeap	-0.3.2]#



Tools to Detect Rogue Access Points: Netstumbler

NetStumbler is a Windows utility for WarDriving written by MariusMilner

Netstumbler is a high-level WLAN scanner. It operates by sending a steady stream of broadcast packets on all possible channels

Access points (APs) respond to broadcast packets to verify their existence, even if beacons have been disabled

NetStumbler displays:

- Signal Strength
- MAC Address
- SSID
- Channel details



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E H Netstumbler: Screenshot

Certified Ethical Hacker

erge 2.ns1:1	(and		. <u> </u>				/	w	l	0
Channels	≜ MAC	Ch_	WEP	Туре	SSID /	Name	Vendor	SNR SNR+	Latitude	Lo
2.1	0002200F9D21	1		AP	AirWave	Happy Donuts	Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	20		
N 2	00601bF02B88	3		ÁΡ	AirWave	AirWaveOne	Agere (Lucent) WaveLAN	10		
V 3	00022D0FCEC8	11		AP	AirWave	AP2 Printer's Inc Mountainview	Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	27		
8 4	00601DF05B5C	3,5		AP	AirWave	AP1 Printer's Inc Mountainview	Agere (Lucent) WaveLAN	46		
\$ 5	0040964429BA	6	Yes	AP	Alan2		Cisco (Aironet)	10	N37.413520	1
5 6	00601DIELAFE	11		AP	Alpha		Agere (Lucent) WaveLAN	9	N37.332253	1
Δ ⁴ 7	00409630E8b8	1		AP	alpha		Cisco (Aironet)	32	N37.412748	4
A 8	004096492BE5	6	Yes	AP	amdwlan		Cisco (Aironet)	8		
A 9	006010220094	3		AP	Angela's Airport Arena	Angela's Animal Town	Agere (Lucent) WaveLAN	31	N37.442843	1
00022000855	00601bF1CC79	5		AP	Angela's Airport Arena	Hitoshi's Hangover Haven	Agere (Lucent) WaveLAN	48	N37.443073	1
00022027407	00904B08489b	1		AP	any		Gemtek (D-Link)	13	N37.410712	1
00400624702	0030AB0650A6	7	Yes	AP	ANY		Delta Networks	11	N37.333678	1
0040962A702	00022b0C330C	1	Yes	AP	Apartment		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	2		
00409632A00	00022D08A6A9	1		AP	Apple Network 08a6a9	Mignot Base Station	Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	13		
and the second sec	A CONSTRACT	T.		4P	Annie Network 1 (Fidb7		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	5		
004090556311	000220110087			3 61 1-3	rippro riterite areas r					
004096355528	 ■ 0002201F5087 ■ 0002201F6538 	i		AP	Apple Network 1f6538		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	-1		
00409635528	 ● 0002201F5087 ● 0002201F6538 ▲ 	i		AP	Apple Network 1f6538		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	-1		1
00409635b28	0002201F5087 0002201F6538 1	1		AP	Apple Network 1f6538		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	-1		
00409635028 00409635028 1 00022b0FCEC 00022b0FCEC 00022b1F650 00022b1F650 00022b1F650 00002b1F650 00002b1F650 00002b1F650		1		AP	Apple Network 116538	Milley	Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	-1		1
00409635028 00409635028 00409635028 00022b0FCECI 00022b0FCECI 00022b1F6508 00022b1F6508 00601b1E3741 00601bF02888 00601bF0585C 00601bF0585C 00601bF0585C 00601bF24745	✓ 0002201F6538 ✓ 0002201F6538 ✓ 0002201F6538 ✓ 0002201F6538 ✓ 0 ✓ 0 ✓ 0 ✓ 0 ✓ 0 ✓ 0 ✓ 0 ✓ 0 ✓ 0	1		AP	Apple Network 116538		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	-1		
00409635028 00409635028 00409635028 00022b0FCECI 00022b0FCECI 00022b1F6508 00022b1F6508 00601b1E3741 00601bF02888 00601bF02888 00601bF0585C 00601bF0585C 00601bF24745 4lan2	OU02201F5638 OU02201F6538 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02	i		AP	Apple Network 116538		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	-1		
00409635028 00409635028 00409635028 0002200FCEC 0002200FCEC 0002201B7657 0002201B7657 0002201F6506 00601DF02888 00601DF02888 00601DF02888 00601DF02888 00601DF02884 4lan2 4lan2	OU02201F5538 OU02201F6538 OU02201F6538 OU02201F6538 O OU02201F6538 O OU02201F6538 O OU02201F6538 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU0			AP	Apple Network 116538		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	-1		
00409635028; 00409635028; 00409635028; 00022b0FCECI 00022b0FCECI 00022b1F656; 00022b1F656; 000601b183741 00601bF0588; 00601bF0588; 00601bF0588; 00601bF0588; 4 Alan2 4 alpha 4 amdwlan	OU02201F558F OU02201F6538 SignoVNoise, dBm 40 -50 -60			AP	Apple Network 116538		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	1	ľ.	
00409635028 00409635028 00409635028 00022b0FCECI 00022b0FCb10 00022b1F650 00022b1F6506 00601b183741 00601bF05850 00600	OU02201F558F OU02201F6538 OU02201F6538 Signol/Noise, dBm 40 -60 -60 -70 -80 -90 O O		÷	AP	Apple Network 116538		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	1	, International design of the second	
00409635028; 00409635028; 00409635028; 0002200FCECI 0002200FD104 0002201F6506 006010183741 006010F02886 006010F02886 006010F02886 006010F0585C 006010F0585C 006010F0484 dapla d	OU02201F558F OU02201F5538 OU02201F6538 Signol/Noise, dBm 40 -60 -60 -70 -80 -90				Apple Network 116538		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	4 10		
00409635028; 00409635028; 00409635028; 0002200FCECI 0002201F006 0002201F6506 0060101E3741 006010F02886 00	OU02201F5638 OU02201F6538 OU02201F65 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU02201F5 OU0220	i		AP	Apple Network 116538		Agere (Lucent) Orinoco	-1		

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Tools to Detect Rogue Access Points: MiniStumbler

MiniStumbler is the smaller sibling of a free product called NetStumbler

By default, most WLAN access points (APs) broadcast their Service Set Identifier (SSID) to anyone who will listen. This flaw in WLAN is used by MiniStumbler

It can connect to a global positioning system (GPS)

🔏 MiniStumbler	∢ × 11:19	⊗		
MAC	SSID	-		
00022D09018F	WlanNetwork2			
O0022D0C4884	WlanNetwork1			
00001037C01F9	3COM			
0002B365E560	intelap			
004005DE21A7	default	=		
O0409624D1D4	encomwireless			
00409626296F	encomwireless			
004096257026	Cybs500WireLess12			
0040962628F8	Cybs500WireLess12:			
O0022D01DC19	CalgaryZoo			
F202A800E102	galaxy			
00045AED6865	linksys	1000		
0,000220029091	Grand&Tov	-		
4 Ⅲ	illere off life			
Ready Not sca	annin GPS Off 58	В		
File View Opt Spd	GPS 🕨 🕲 🖉	쬐 ~		

Source: www.netstumbler.com

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ClassicStumbler scans and displays the wireless access points information within range

It displays the information about the signal strength, noise strength, signal to noise ratio, and channel of the access point





AirFart is used to detect wireless devices and calculate their signal strength

It implements a modular n-tier architecture with the data collection at the bottom tier and a graphical user interface at the top





C EH AirFart: Screenshot

Ethernet Address	SSID	Manufacturer	Strength	Strength Bar	Packet Count	Active
00:06:25:53:2a:9a	emac	The Linksys Group, Inc.	24%		261	
00:30:ab:22:72:08	Wincless	unknown	23%		471	
00:09:5b:25:26:88	(none)	unknown	39%		131	
00:01:f4:ec:57:ca		unknown	44%		3	
00:50:18:03:b3:74	carlwire	ADVANCED MULTIMEDIA II	NTE 39%		198	
00:04:5a:cd:5d:71	irc	unknown	39%		6	
00:10:91:00:44:38	BrentBrown	NO WIRES NEEDED BV	21%		11	
00:40:96:57:25:be	(none)	Ciron (Cisco)	35%		1	
00:30:ab:16:80:d8	PC_MOON	unknown	35%		2	
00:40:96:34:14:70		Ciron (Cisco)	39%		36	
00:40:96:34:22:b9		Ciron (Cisco)	38%		1	
00:40:96:29:75:c4	cp-nc	Ciron (Cisco)	21%		2	



AP Radar is a wireless profile manager which is based on Linux/GTK+ graphical netstumbler

It is meant to replace the manual process of running iwconfig and dhclient

AP Radar can be used to reconfigure different APs with ease

😑 🗛 Radar 0.52									
*	1	AP Ra	dar 🔾						
Access Poin	Access Point List								
www.personaltelco.net master χ Ch 5 -43 dBm									
<no ssid=""></no>	master	0	Ch 11	-51 dBm					
Home	master	0	Ch 5	-70 dBm					
default	master	х	Ch 5	-88 dBm					
rancho	master	х	Ch 5	-78 dBm					
NETGEAR	master	х	Ch 11	-81 dBm					
wifi0(hostap)								
www.perso	naltelco.net	: man	aged 10	.11.112.103					
default gate	eway: 10.1	1.112	.1 <1 sec	:					
config									
🗹 ping defa	ult gateway	1							
🗹 run /sbin	/dhcpcd on	assoc	iate						



Hotspotter is an automatic wireless client penetration tool

It monitors the network passively for probe request frames to identify the preferred networks of Windows XP clients

Then hotspotter compares it to a list of common hotspot network names

It allows the client to authenticate when matched to a common hotspot name



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Wireless network administrators 'Cloak' their access points by putting them in 'Stealth' mode

Cloaked access points are not detected by active scanners like NetStumbler

The only way to detect cloaked access point is by passive scanners like Kismet or Airsnort







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WarDriving Tool: Shtumble

shtumble detects nearby access points, allows to select one, starts DHCP if appropriate (usually), and performs WEP or WPA or other custom config for known networks







Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)

Secret key is created during 4-way handshake authentication

It dynamically changes secret key

Function is used to create new keys based on the original secret key created during authentication

Initialization vectors increases to 48 bits

First 4 bits indicate QoS traffic class

Remaining 44 bits are used as a counter

Over 500 trillion key streams are possible

Initialization vectors are hashed

It is harder to detect key streams with the same initialization vectors



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LEAP: The Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol

Proprietary, closed solution:

• LEAP was started (without many details) by Cisco as unaffected by WEP vulnerabilities (Cisco 2002)

LEAP conducts mutual authentication:

- Client is assured that the access point is an authorized one
- Uses per-session keys that can be renewed regularly:
 - Makes the collection of a pad or weak IVs more difficult
 - Secret key can be changed before the collection is complete
- The user is authenticated, instead of the hardware:
 - MAC address access control lists are not needed
- LEAP requires an authentication server (RADIUS) to support the access points



Dictionary attacks

- Password-based scheme
- Passwords should be guessable (**Joshua Wright** 2003)

LEAP access points do not use weak IVs

- Use MS-CHAP v2, show the same weaknesses as MS-CHAP (Wright 2003)
- There are many variants of the Extensible Authentication Protocol, such as EAP-TLS and PEAP





ASLEAP is an hacking tool, released as a proof-of-concept to demonstrate weakness in LEAP and uses off-line dictionary attack to break LEAP passwords

Features:

- Recovers weak LEAP passwords (duh)
- Can read live from any wireless interface in RFMON mode
- Can monitor a single channel, or perform channel hopping to look for targets
- Handles dictionary and genkeys files up to 4 TB in size





CEH ASLEAP: Screenshot

🛃 jwrij	ght@mercury:-/asleap		×
[jwrig /dic asleap Using	ht@mercury asleap]\$ t/words.idx 1.4 - actively rec the passive attack	time ./asleap -r data/pptp.apc -f/dict/words.db -n over LEAP/PPTP passwords. <jwright@hasborg.com> method.</jwright@hasborg.com>	^
Captur	ed PPTP exchange in	formation:	
	username:	scott	
	auth challenge:	e3a5d0775370bda51e16219a06b0278f	
	peer challenge:	84c4b33e00d9231645598acf91c38480	
	peer response:	565fe2492fd5fb88edaec934c00d282c046227406c31609b	
	challenge:	7c00a1a403ca7df5	
	hash bytes:	816b	
	NT hash:	18073343f630b5f82c38c03437f2816b	-
	password:	turquoise	
real	Om0.261s		The second
user	Om0.077s		
sys	0m0.007s		
[jwrig	ht@mercury asleap]\$		~



Cain & Abel is a password recovery tool for Microsoft Operating Systems

It allows recovery of several kind of wireless network keys

Features:

- Password decoders to immediately decode encrypted passwords from several sources
- WEP Cracker can quickly recover 64-bit and 128-bit WEP keys if enough unique WEP IVs are available
- Wireless Scanner detects Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) using 802.11x
- 802.11 capture files decoder can decode wireless capture files from Wireshark and/or Airodump-ng containing WEP or WPA-PSK encrypted 802.11 frames
- Wireless zero configuration password dumper

Cain & Abel: Screenshot 1

TM



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Cain & Abel: Screenshot 2

Korek's WEP Attack X WEP Key Length-Initial part of the key (Hex) Keys tested A 50 128 bits -WEP IVs-Fudge Factor Last KB Brute-Force Keyspace alfa-numeric kevs only 1702528 2 • last key byte -BCD hex digits only Korek's Attacks-▼ A u15 ▼ A s5 2 ▼ A s3 ▼ A 4 u5 2 ▼ A u13 2 ▼ A u5 2 ▼ A u13 3 ▼ A s5 3 ▼ A u5 3 ▼ A 4 s13 A neg ✓ A s13 ▼ A u13 1 ▼ A s5 1 ▼ A u5 1 ▼ A u5 4 ▼ A 4 u5 1 KB Depth Byte (vote) 6C(277)47(0) 1 0 0/ 1 13)21(12)97(12)05(0)F0(1 0/ 1 8) 27)13(24)CC(15)9C(12)9D(6F(280)8B(0 23 15)28(12)39(0) 0/ 1 63(249)58(15)86(15)9F(C 0/ 1 61(235)47(28)B8(28)36(24)01(15)DO(15) a 4 24)99(6C(196)B5(15)68(13)8D(13)57(12) 1 0/ 1 5 0/ 1 6E(314)3E(45)41(28)D2(24)18(15)40(15) n 6 0/ 1 65(186)8E(27)C9(25)5A(15)7D(13)E3(13) e 7 0/ 1 74(272)5B(39)31(28)CC(25)0B(15)EC(13) t 8 0/ 1 6B(110)18(26)B2(15)06(15)61(15)4D(13) k 9 24)D4(0/ 1 15)EB(15)F6(15) 65(684)64(15)12(e 10 0/ 1 79(280)2D(30)01(30)31(28)77(24)FO(15) У 11 0/ 1 30(326)7B(81)0E(41)1C(39)A5(24) ñ 28)19(WEP Key found ! ASCII: localnetkey00 Hex: 6C6F63616C6E65746B65793030 Start Exit

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AirPcap	BSSID	Last seen	Vendor	Signal	SSID	Enc	Mode				
Driver version: 2.0.0.678	🐮 0012A9087EC0	26/02/2008 - 21	3COM EUR	-60 dBm	localnet	WPA	Infras				
Current channel: 9											
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Capture WEP IVs to dump.ivs file File size: 24 bytes Analyze Delete Save As WEP Injection TxRate (Mbps)											

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MAC Sniffing and AP Spoofing

Attackers can easily sniff MAC addresses because they must appear in the clear even when WEP is enabled

Attackers can use those advantages in order to masquerade as a valid MAC address by programming the wireless card and getting into the wireless network and using the wireless pipes

Spoofing MAC addresses is easy. Using packet-capturing software, attackers can determine a valid MAC address using one packet

To perform a spoofing attack, an attacker must set up an access point (rogue) near the target wireless network or in a place where a victim may believe that wireless Internet is available



Defeating MAC Address Filtering in Windows

Changing MAC address is an easy job in Windows

Mostly wireless networking equipments send the MAC address as a clear text even if WEP is enabled

MAC address of machines in the wireless network can be sniffed using WireShark

Next thing is to change your MAC address to the one in the 'allowed access' list







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Manually Changing the MAC Address in Windows XP and 2000

MAC address in Windows XP or 2000 can be changed by modifying Windows registry

Go to Start >>Run and type in regedit. It will start the Registry Editor



Certified Ethical Hacker

Manually Changing the MAC Address in Windows XP and 2000 (cont'd)



Certified Ethical Hacker

Manually Changing the MAC Address in Windows XP and 2000 (cont'd)

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nie Edit	Mary	Pavorites	Help				
		-0	(25DBCE51-6C8F-4A72-8A6D-854C284FC825)		Nane	Type	Data
		÷-	{36F C9E60 <c465-11 cf-8056-444553540000}<="" td=""><td></td><td>(Default)</td><td>REG_SZ</td><td>(value not set)</td></c465-11>		(Default)	REG_SZ	(value not set)
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		1 반 📖	(4D30E960-E325-11CE-0*C1-000020E103L0)		B DriverDateData	REG DENARY	00 00 62 65 69 01 61 01
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	11		(4E36E36A4E325-11CE-BHC1-080028E10318)		at DriverEnable	REG SZ	1
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		- 60	(4D30E971-E325-11CE-0*C1-080028E1031.6)		WinfSection	REG SZ	vilu:48.1nstal
		i p-🗎	(4D36E 972-E325-11CE-8*C1-08002bE 1031 8)		*NetchingDeviceId	REG SZ	persola lucant technologies-wavelan (ess-c 508)
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Tool to Detect MAC Address Spoofing: Wellenreiter

Wellenreiter is a wireless network discovery and auditing tool

It can discover networks (BSS/IBSS) and detect ESSID broadcasting or nonbroadcasting networks and their WEP capabilities and the manufacturer automatically

It also identifies traffic that is using a spoofed MAC address without relying on the MAC OUI information



Source: *http://www.wellenreiter.net/*

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Tool to Detect MAC Address Spoofing: Wellenreiter (cont'd)

DHCP and ARP traffic is decoded and displayed to give further information about the networks

An WireShark/tcpdump-compatible dumpfile and an application savefile are automatically created

Using a supported GPS device and the gpsd location of the discovered networks can be tracked

Wellenreiter II				8
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Protocol	Count			
802.11	695			
802.11 DS	678			
802.11 Data	17			
802.11 LLC	12			
802.11 Management	678			
802.11 Rates	678			
802.11 SSID	678			
802.11 Tim	678			
Prism	695			
o 🎫 🔊	- D 🕯	n 🔁 🕈	\$ [] 2	23:23

Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MITM)

Two types of MITM:

• Eavesdropping:

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Hacker

- Happens when an attacker receives a data communication stream
- Not using security mechanisms such as Ipsec, SSH, or SSL makes data vulnerable to an unauthorized user
- Manipulation:
 - An extended step of eavesdropping
 - Can be done by ARP poisoning



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Denial-of-Service Attacks

Wireless LANs are susceptible to the same protocol-based attacks that plague wired LANs

Wireless NoS

WLANs send information via radio waves on public frequencies, making them susceptible to inadvertent or deliberate interference from traffic using the same radio band

Types of DoS attacks:

- Physical Layer
- Data-Link Layer
- Network Layer



Wireless Access Point (2.4 MHz)

Jamming Signal (2.4 MHz)



Fatajack is a modified WLAN Jack that sends a deauth instead of an auth

This tool highlights poor AP security and works by sending authentication requests to an AP with an inappropriate authentication algorithm and status code. This causes most to drop the relevant associated session







Hijacking and Modifying a Wireless Network

TCP/IP packets go through switches, routers, and APs

Each device looks at the destination IP address and compares it with the local IP addresses

If the address is not in the table, the device hands the packet to its default gateway

This table is a dynamic one that is built up from traffic passing through the device and through Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) notifications from new devices joining the network





Hijacking and Modifying a Wireless Network (cont'd)

There is no authentication or verification of the validity of request received by the device



A malicious sends messages to routing devices and APs stating that his MAC address is associated with a known IP address

All traffic that goes through that device destined for the hijacked IP address will be handed off to the hacker's machine





A cell-phone jammer transmits radio frequency signals similar to that used by cellular devices to cut off communications between cell phones and cell base stations

Jammer's signal has enough high power to cancel out cellular signals

Some of the high-end jammers block all frequency signals disabling switching over different network types

Range of the jammer depends on its power and the local environment (≈9m-1.6km)

Phone jamming is also known as Denial-of-service



Phone Jammers (cont'd)

Jammers typically consists of:

• Antenna

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- Circuitry
 - Voltage-controlled oscillator
 - Tuning circuit
 - Noise generator
 - RF amplification (gain stage)
- Power supply





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Phone Jammers (cont'd)

Phone jammers provide solution for areas where cellular communications may cause inconvenience and violation of security policies as:

- Theatres and museums
- Lecture rooms, libraries, schools, and Universities
- Restaurants and public transport
- Places of Worship

Hacker

Ethical

- Recording studios
- Businesses (conferences, board of directors rooms, seminars, and meeting rooms)
- Government building and Government complexes
- Law enforcement facilities
- Police stations
- Drug enforcement facilities
- Prison facilities, jails, etc.
- Courts of law and court houses
- Military installations, military complexes, and military training centers









Mobile Blocker is an easy to use costeffective solution for mobile communications control

Features:

TM

Hacker

Ethical

Certified

- LED On/Off power indicator
- Accessory antennas for omnidirectional or bi-directional blockage
- Optional remote switch enables immediate On/Off control of the transmitter





Pocket Cellular Style Cell Phone Jammer

A pocket sized cell phone jammer

It can be used discreetly whilst in a pocket, bag, or even placed for others to see without alerting suspicion

It has an effective range of up to 20 metres



2.4Ghz Wi-Fi & Wireless Camera Jammer

Jammer for Wireless cctv cameras, Wi fi, Bluetooth. 100mw total output, range up to 10m

It is a 2.4 GHz jamming device utilizes unique and intelligent technology that will block video, the signals of wireless cameras, wireless LANs, and Bluetooth



Features:

- Palm sized and portable
- Built-in rechargeable battery which can be used for upto 1.5 hours outdoors
- AC adaptor input for indoor use

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3 Watt Digital Cell Phone Jammer

3 Watt Digital Cell Phone Jammer is a CXT-5 cell phone jammer

It prevents anyone in the surrounding area from operating a mobile phone

It achieves this by blocking BCCH between the handset and receiver of the system provider

3 Watt Digital Cell Phone Jammer is powered by a 12 volt mains adaptor

It can be used with a battery pack to enable the portable device and is simple to operate



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3 Watt Quad Band Digital Cellular Mobile Phone Jammer

Features:

- Strong, tough, robust, and high power output for industrial commercial usage
- Blocks noise or disturbance from unexpected cellular phone calls or text messages (SMS)
- Worldwide compatible
- Paralyzes cellular phone communication links within an effective area
- For use in meeting rooms, conference rooms, museums, galleries, theatres, concert halls etc
- Easy to install and operate
- Indoor and outdoor usage (not splash proof)
- Can be housed in a plastic container



20W Quad Band Digital Cellular Mobile Phone Jammer

Features

- Strong, tough, robust, die-cast aluminum casing
- High power output for industrial commercial usage
- Blocks noise or disturbance from unexpected cellular phone calls or text messages (SMS)
- Worldwide compatible
- Paralyzes cellular phone communication links within an effective area
- Sphere coverage area with a radius of its effective distance
- For use in meeting rooms, conference rooms, museums, and galleries
- Easy to install and operate
- Indoor and outdoor usage
- Directional high gain patch antenna
- Anti-tamper proof antenna

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40W Digital Cellular Mobile Phone Jammer

Features

- Ultimate power phone jammer
- Strong, tough, robust, and die-cast aluminum casing
- High power output for industrial commercial usage
- Blocks noise or disturbance from unexpected cellular phone calls or text messages (SMS)
- Worldwide compatible
- Paralyze cellular phone communication links within an effective area
- Sphere coverage area with a radius of its effective distance
- For use in museums, galleries, theatres, concert halls etc.
- Easy to install and operate; plug and play
- Weatherproof high gain base station type antenna
- Dual inter cooler for ultimate performance





Detecting a Wireless Network



Using an operating system, such as Windows XP or Mac with Airport, to detect available networks



Using handheld PCs (Tool: MiniStumbler)



Using passive scanners (Tool: Kismet, KisMAC)



Using active beacon scanners (Tool: NetStumbler, MacStumbler, iStumbler)







Scanning Tools

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Scanning Tools

Kismet

PrismStumbler

MacStumbler

Mognet

WaveStumbler

StumbVerter

AP Scanner

Wireless Security Auditor

AirTraf

Wifi Finder

eEye Retina WiFI





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Scanning Tool: Kismet

Kismet is completely passive, capable of detecting traffic from APs and wireless clients alike (including NetStumbler clients) as well as closed networks

It requires 802.11b capable of entering RF monitoring mode. Once in RF monitoring mode, the card is no longer able to associate with a wireless network

It needs to run as root, but can switch to lesser privileged UID as it begins to capture

To hop across channels, run $kismet_hopper-p$

Closed network with no clients authenticated is shown by <nossid> and is updated when client logs on

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Kismet: Screenshot

		Landrick in Laternia accepts	nativitation 🛙
Hetwork List—(Autofit) Name pEthFind3r (no ssid) KrullNet1 linkaya narley (no ssid) ! PARMAS (no ssid) GRXNirelessNetwork ! SECMAS (no ssid) ! (Lucent Outdoor Router)	T W Ch Packts Flag A Y 06 171 A N 05 1 A Y 06 27 A N 06 81 FU4 A N 06 312 D N 20 A2 A N 07 30 A Y 06 1 A Y 06 1 A Y 06 2 A N 07 13 D N 1 A4 O N 267	gs Data Cint 70 35 0 0 8 2 17 1 20 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 65 267 1	Hturks 105 Pokets 1258 Cryptd 104 Ueak 0 Noise 289 Disord 289 Pkts/s 30
Ct at us			E1apsd -000027-
Found IP 159.139.90.1 for Found IP 159.139.90.1 for Found IP 159.139.90.1 for Found IP 159.139.90.1 for Found IP 159.139.120.13 for Batteru: AC charging 100% O	(no esid)::00:04:76:8 (no esid)::00:04:76:8 (no esid)::00:04:76:8 r (no esid)::00:80:80 n0m0s	38:A7:O4 via ARP 38:A7:O4 via ARP 38:A7:O4 via ARP 38:A7:O4 via ARP D:DE:60:E3 via TCP	

Source: www.kismetwireless.net

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Scanning Tool: Prismstumbler

Prismstumbler is a wireless LAN (WLAN) that scans for beacon frames from access points

It operates by constantly switching channels and monitors any frames received on the currently selected channel

The program was created by using ideas and codesnippets from prismdump, AirSnort, and WireShark

Prismstumbler will also find private networks. Because the method used in Prismstumbler is receive only, it can also find networks with weaker signals and discover more networks



Source: http://prismstumbler.sourceforge.net/

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Scanning Tool: MacStumbler

MacStumbler is a utility used to display information about nearby 802.11b and 802.11g wireless access points

It is mainly designed to be a tool to help find access points while traveling or to diagnose wireless network problems

MacStumbler requires an Apple Airport Card and MacOS 10.1 or greater. MacStumbler does not currently support any kind of PCMCIA or USB wireless device



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Scanning Tool: Mognet



Mognet is a simple, lightweight 802.11b sniffer written in Java and available under the GPL

It features real-time capture output, support for all 802.11b generic and framespecific headers, easy display of frame contents in hex or ASCII, text mode capture for GUI-less devices, and loading/saving capture sessions in libpcap format

Mognet requires a Java Development Kit 1.3 or higher and a working C compiler for native code compilation

9 2	Mognet		EXD
<u>File</u> <u>Capture</u>	e <u>M</u> ode		
Туре	Source	Dest	SSID
Beacon frame	00 04 5 a d0 eb db	ff ff ff ff ff ff ff	reta 📘 🔺
Beacon frame	00 04 5 a 0e + 💶	ff ff ff ff ff ff ff	linksys
Beacon frame	00 04 5 a d0 eb db	ff ff ff ff ff ff ff	ratio 1
Beacon frame	00 04 5 a d0 eb db	ff ff ff ff ff ff ff	repail.
Beacon frame	00 04 5a 0e 📲 📲	ff ff ff ff ff ff ff	linksys 🛛 🚟
Beacon frame	00 04 5 a d0 eb db	ff ff ff ff ff ff ff	ratio 🔍 💌
Detail Hex I	Dump ASCII Dum	IP	
Source address: 00 04 5 a 0e 🚛 斗 🔺			
Destination address: ff ff ff ff ff ff 🔤			
BSS Id: 00 04 5a 0e 🗰 🖬			
Fragment number: 6			
Sequence num	ber: 2822		•
Frame numbe	r: 66, Frame size:	: 60 bytes	

Source: *http://www.node99.org//*

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Scanning Tool: WaveStumbler

WaveStumbler is a console-based 802.11 network mapper for Linux

It reports the basic AP information like channel, WEP, ESSID, and MAC

It consists of a patch against the kernel driver, orinoco.c, which makes it possible to send the scan command to the driver via the /proc/hermes/ethX/cmds file

The answer is then sent back via a netlink socket

WaveStumbler listens to this socket and displays the output data on the console





Source: *http://www.cqure.net/*

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Scanning Tool: Netchaser for Palm Tops

Find and easily connect to WiFi hotspots with your Palm handheld computer

Access Point Info:

- AP MAC address
- AP SSID
- Signal strength
- Channel
- Loss-of-signal time and date display
- Latitude and longitude of strongest signal

Full Logging Support:

- Log all access point data to a file for post-processing
- CSV standard file suitable for import into any database or spreadsheet

NetChase	er SSID	7 APs Found		
Information				
I S N S C L L V	SID: "simply" 1AC: 00:50:F2:7 ignal: -78dBm hannel: 6 ast Seen: 5:51 at: 4137.7597 on: 09342.1735 VEP is enabled.	9:16:5C pm N 5 W		
ОК)			
NetChas	er	21 APs Found		
SIG WEP	SSID	l ime		
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	ueruuri .	0.05 pm 8		
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Source: http://www.bitsnbolts.com/

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Scanning Tool: Wavemon

Wavemon is a neurses-based monitor for wireless devices

TM

Hacker

Ethical

Certified

Wavemon allows watching of signal and noise levels, packet statistics, device configuration, and network parameters of hardware or a wireless network

It has currently only been tested with the Lucent Orinoco series of cards, although it should work (with varying features) with all devices supported by the wireless kernel extensions written by Jean Tourrilhes



Source: http://freshmeat.net/

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Scanning Tool: Wireless Security Auditor (WSA)

An IBM research prototype of an 802.11

A wireless LAN security auditor, running on Linux or an iPAQ PDA

WSA helps network administrators by auditing the wireless network for security

Vulnerabilities in the network can be discovered before hackers break in the network

-		602.0 Windess S	earity Autor (USP) $ imes$
<u>F</u> ile	Options	Help	
Sourc	e address	SSID	Signal
00:40:	:96:27:ff:4	4Б ???	25% 📥
00:40:	:96:24:83:9	õe tsunami –	54%
00:40:	:96:27:ec:7	74 IBM	40%
			-

Source: http://www.research.ibm.com/

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Scanning Tool: AirTraf

AirTraf is a wireless sniffer that can detect and determine exactly what is being transmitted over 802.11 wireless networks

It is developed as an open source program

It tracks and identifies legitimate and rogue access points, keeps performance statistics on a by-user and by-protocol basis, measures the signal strength of network components, and more

AirTraf: 1,0,0 '02 - Dhannel Scanning: listen - Activity Overview	ing using ← Detaile	Disco Airone d Breekdown	et (ethi)							
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F-force new scan Up/Down	/PgUp/PgDn	-scroll wind	doe X-oxit							

Source: www.elixar.com

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WiFi Finder checks for 802.11b and 802.11g signals without a computer or PDA

The user interface consists of a single button and three LEDs that indicate available signal strength







Source: http://www.kensington.com/

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WifiScanner is designed to discover wireless node

It dumps the traffic in realtime and the sniffed channels can be changed





CEH WifiScanner: Screenshot

Certified Ethical Hacker

2 001051051741071 LUN		
- VVIV61201711CB1	(0,135)	
IN VX+TX+X0+33+2X+	I_\V/270/	LI BEACON + 556
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		II Channel + 1
		11 Invalidt 4
		II Crypted: 9171
		II Weak t 0
		11 Last IV: 00:49:70
		Packets: 18819
		II Scan
		11 1
		11 0000000001111 1
		11 1234567890123 4
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eEye Retina WiFI does not scan your eye, but it does scan the area and detects the presence of wireless devices located within a network or connected wirelessly to the network

This tool detects rogue mobile devices and transmitting laptops

eEye's Retina WiFi Scanner enables a company to ensure their customers' networks are secure

















Simple Wireless Scanner

Simple Wireless Scanner (SWScanner) is an application for Linux environments designed for scanning, configuring, and managing wireless networks

SWScanner is a wardriving tool, and has a high level of compatibility with NetStumbler

Features:

- SWScanner uses wireless-extensions
- Has detailed and updated information of signal, noise, and other wireless network parameters of the selected interface
- Has GPS integration
- Has the possibility of storing network settings of the detected access points
- It simplifies the asociating/deasociating process to an access point
- Has possibility of storing scanned data
- It simplifies wardriving
- Combatible log data between NetStumbler and SWScanner; i.e.: it is possible to open a text or summary file produced with *NS*. *NS* will also recognize log files produced by SWScanner
- Conversion of log (text or summary) files (from *NS* or SWScanner) to the well-known widely used ESRI Shapefile format

Simple Wireless Scanner: Ethicel Hocker Screenshot 1

General	
🕑 Use E	SSID to store network settings
O Use M	AC address to store network settings
On startu	n:
Start s	canning
Preselect	nterface: eth1
Open file:	
DHCP clie	nt:
Executabl	e: /sbin/dhclient
🗹 <u>U</u> se a	terminal for stdout: //usr/bin/xterm
Serial Pa	ameters:
	I(Hu)CD
Device: 7	iewity50
Device: 🛛	igure serial <u>d</u> evice
Device: 7 Cont	igure serial <u>d</u> evice peed (baud): 4800 \$ Parity: Even \$
Device: 7 Cont	igure serial <u>d</u> evice peed (baud): 4800 Data bits: 7
Device: 7 Cont S GPS:	igure serial <u>d</u> evice peed (baud): 4800 Data bits: 7
Device: 7 Con: S GPS: Speed unit	igure serial <u>d</u> evice peed (baud): 4800 Data bits: 7 s: km/h
Device: Com S GPS: Speed unit	igure serial <u>d</u> evice peed (baud): 4800 Data bits: 7 s: km/h

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Simple Wireless Scanner: Screenshot 2

T	Conversion cos	1-SUStanner
Origin:	sion:	Destination:
SWScanner GPS	og file (*.swl) 🜲	ESRI Shapefiles (*.shp *.shx *.dbf) 🜲
Source:		ESRI Shapefiles (*.shp *.shx *.dbf) NetStumbler summary files (*.nsf)
Select a SWScanne	r GPS log file (Net	Stumbler txt log compatible):
Destination:		
Select an ESRI Sha	oefile:	

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Simple Wireless Scanner: Screenshot 3

Image: Show all AccessPoints Show all AccessPoints Image: Show all AccessPoints					
Show all AccessPoints Show all AccessPoints Using sound CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL					
Show all AccessPoints Using sound Filter (ON) ESSID CHANNEL 000740DE1 1 000740DE1 11 2A 12 3Com 13 3Com 2 3Com 4 5 5 6 7 ALVAREZ 8 9 9 BarRAKA balkin54g Bodegon Comtrend YES Comtrend Comtrend Comtrend Comtrend					
Show all AccessPoints Using sound Filter (0N) CHANNEL 000740DE1 1 10 11 146006428 12 3Com 3 3Com 4 3Com 5 3Com 6 3Com 7 ALVAREZ 8 ARRANZ 9 banservices MAC BARRAKA WEP belkin54g NO YES Comtrend Comtrend Status (eth1) P: 0.0.0 P: 0.0.0 Netmask: 0.0.0 Mode: Managed ESSID: WiForcada Channel: 6				0	
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	00:01:36:0C:31:65	CYBERTAN TECHNOLOGY, INC.	YES	5	OFF 58
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tatus (eth1) P: 0.0.0.0 Netmask: 0.0.0.0 Iode: Managed ESSID: WiForcada Channel: 6					
P: 0.0.0.0 Netmask: 0.0.0.0 Iode: Managed ESSID: WiForcada Channel: 6		GPS			
Node: Managed ESSID: WiForcada Channel: 6	oadcast: 0.0.0.0	(Start GPS			
	P: NO KeyLength: -	Lat/deg): Long/deg): Sneed /k	m/h)·	ΔP's	
Signal: -68 🚅 Noise: -32 Link Qual: 221	AP: 00:12:17:DE:17:BC	Long(deg). Speed (k	000	Ars	
		10,00000 10,00000000 10,000000	000	0	
					6

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Lists available networks, with data like signal strength, encryption status, and connection speed

🗙 🔺 Wirel	ess lan scanner					_ 🗆 ×
<u>F</u> ile <u>S</u> cann	ing <u>R</u> escan S <u>c</u> ripts					<u>H</u> elp
ESSID		M Enc Rate	e RSSI	Last beacon		4
2.wlan.ii المجاهد 2.wlan.ii	nformatik.uni-leipzig.de _AN		11 🔒 -51 dBm 54 🔒 -46 dBm	5ms 40ms		
strabag	AN NETWORK		54 - 59 dBm	60ms		
wlan.info	ormatik.uni-leipzig.de ormatik.uni-leipzig.de		54 39 dBm 11 53 dBm	1ms 26ms		
ESSID	wlan.informatik.uni-leip	zig.de				
мас	00:07:40:A0:75:E2					
Name	wlan.informatik router 54MB 5. Etage					
Cell	02					
Protocol	IEEE 802.11bg					
Channel	6					
Encryption	on					
Bitrate	54					
Supported rates	es 1, 2, 5.5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 54					
RSSI	-55 dBm					
Last beacon	27 ms					
Mode	master				- -1	
eth1: 0 new cel	ls (12:51:02)				1	

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Sniffing Tools





AiroPeekNAI Wireless SnifferWireSharkVPNmonitorlAerosolvxSnifferEtherPEGDriftNetWinDump

ssidsniff





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A wireless management tool needed to deploy, secure, and troubleshoot the wireless LAN

It covers the whole wireless LAN management, including site surveys, security assessments, client troubleshooting, WLAN monitoring, remote WLAN analysis, and application layer protocol analysis

It has an enhanced analysis of VoIP

Source: http://www.wildpackets.com/

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AiroPeek: Screenshot

101× **70** (A.e. 14 Fill Tall, View Company Materian Tales Western Field _ [d] XI DSB A Parkets (cores) 410 Packets filtere 41D Start Daphare Packets processed 410 1% Memory usager 누 - 🗄 📰 🖬 🔍 Packet Source Destination 85510 Data Rate Signal Plage Absolute Time Protocol Channel Size 1 Incent(23)1D(50 Broadcast Incent: 23:10:50 2.0 15:40:44.887601 802.11 Be 1 945 * 68 2 Incent: 23:10:50 Broadcast lwoent: 23:10:50 2.0 1 934 * 68 15:40:44.987745 802.11 Be 3 Incent: 23:10:50 Broadcast Incent: 23:10:50 2,0 1 945 * 68 15:40:45.087889 802.11 Be 15:40:45.100033 002.11 De 4 hucent:23:10:50 Decederate lucent: 23:10:50 2.0 1 97% đĎ 5 lucent:23:10:50 Scondcast. lucent: 23:10:50 Z.D 1 92% 1 65 15:40:45.298192 802.11 Be 6 lucent: 23:10:50 Scondcast. lucent: 23:10:50 z.p 1 100% * 65 15:40:45.398336 802.11 Be 65 15:40:45.498480 802.11 Be 7 Incent: 23:10:50 Scondcast. lucent: 23:10:50 Z.D 958 1 1 1 • Packeti 2 💌 🖂 🖓 💭 1 2422 Mile Channel:
 ٠ Signal Level: 924 3 302.11 MC Reader Q Version: 9 Type: 100 Memoryananto § Subtype: \$1000 Seacon § To B5: D & From DS: n -0032: 64 00 01 00 00 08 57 69 60 64 20 42 61 73 65 20 8.....Wild Base 0048: 31 DL 04 82 94 DB LE D3 01 DL 05 D4 0D DL 0D D0 1...... 0064: 00 D0 00 D0 Packets (Nodes) Protocols) Conversidors / Size / Summary / History / Log / Fibers / G Icle 🛏 Accept all packets 6,142 6,142 <u>A</u> 0 O 0 \varTheta (i) Date Time Message 05/23/2001 15:28:52 http://192.216.124.5images/lagine.pif trans 192.168.0.3 AiroPeek aut 05/23/2001 15:29.34 AiroPeek started 05/29/2001 15:39:12 05(29/2001 15:40:39 New people e For Help, press F1 🕂 Start 🛛 🧬 😂 🔄 🔄 📅 AkoPeek - [Capture 1] 🛛 🌠 apwill screen.tif - Capt... 🕹 🌜 📾 — 4:18 PM





Sniffing Tool: NAI Wireless Sniffer

NAI Wireless Sniffer is developed by Network Associates, Inc

It is used for rogue mobile unit detection

It gathers a list of all the wireless devices, whether they are access units or mobile devices, and labels them as such



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MAC Sniffing Tool: WireShark

WireShark is a free network protocol analyzer for Unix and Windows

It allows examination of data from a live network or from a captured file on disk

It has several powerful features, including a rich display filter language and the ability to view the reconstructed stream of a TCP session





WireShark: Screenshot

Elle Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Help Image: Construct Statistics Melp Image: Construct Statistics Melp Image: Construct Statistics Melp Image: Construct Statistics Melp Eller: Image: Construct Statistics Melp No Time Source Destination Protocol Info Statistics Statistics Melp Image: Construct Statistics Melp Image: Construct Statistics Melp No Time Source Destination Protocol Info Statistics Glo. 72074: 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.1 TCP 2459 > http FIN, Ack] Statistic Glo. 72121: 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 TCP Attract Statistics Melp Statistic Glo. 76519: 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 TCP Attract Statistics Melp Statistic Glo. 76519: 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 DNS Standard query A www.m Statistic Glo. 76519: 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 DNS Standard query response NE Statistic Glo. 76519: 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 DNS Standard query response NE Statistic Glo. 76519: 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 NBNS Name query NBSTAT *<00	
Eilter: Expression Clear Apply No Time Source Destination Protocol Info 5452 610.72074: 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.11 TCP 2459 > http [ACK] seq- 5453 610.72121' 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.11 TCP 2459 > http [FIN, ACK] 5454 610.72195 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 TCP http > 2459 [RST, ACK] 5455 610.76519' 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 TCP http > 2459 [RST, ACK] 5456 610.76556 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 DNS Standard query response 5457 611.09368 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 DNS Standard query response 5458 611.09386' 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.102 NBNS Name query response NE 5459 611.46980 192.168.1.4 192.168.1.102 NBNS Name query response NE 5460 611.47022 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 NBNS Name query response NE 5461 612.88506' Cisco-Li a9:b5:eb	a, Q,
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 5452 610.72074: 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.20	
5452 610.72074: 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 TCP 2459 > http [ACK] seq- 5453 610.72121' 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.11 TCP 2459 > http [FIN, ACK] 5454 610.72195 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 TCP http > 2459 [RST, ACK] 5454 610.7619' 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 TCP http > 2459 [RST, ACK] 5455 610.7656' 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.102 DNS Standard query A www. 5456 610.76856' 192.168.1.4 192.168.1.102 DNS Standard query response 5456 611.09368 192.168.1.3 NBNS Name query NBSTAT *<00	4
5453 610.72121' 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.1 TCP 2459 > http [FIN, ACK] 5454 610.72195 192.168.1.1 192.168.1.102 TCP http > 2459 [RST, ACK] 5455 610.76519 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.4 DNS Standard query A www.m 5456 610.76856 192.168.1.4 192.168.1.102 DNS Standard query response 5457 611.09368 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.3 NBNS Name query NBSTAT *<00	20 Ack
5454 610.72195.192.168.1.1 192.168.1.102 TCP http > 2459 [RST, ACK 5455 610.76519 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.4 DNS Standard query A www.m 5456 610.76856 192.168.1.4 192.168.1.102 DNS Standard query response 5457 611.09368 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.3 NBNS Name query NBSTAT *<00	Seq=2
5455 610.76519 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.4 DNS Standard query A www.m 5456 610.76856 192.168.1.4 192.168.1.102 DNS Standard query response 5457 611.09368 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.3 NBNS Name query NBSTAT *<00	Seq=5
5456 610.76856 192.168.1.4 192.168.1.102 DNS Standard query response 5457 611.09368 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.3 NBNS Name query NBSTAT *<00	ikrotil
5457 611.09368 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.3 NBNS Name query NBSTAT *<00	e A 66
5458 611.09580 192.108.1.3 192.108.1.102 NBNS Name query NBSTAT *<00 5460 611.47022 192.168.1.4 192.168.1.4 NBNS Name query NBSTAT *<00	STAT
5460 611.47022 192.168.1.4 192.168.1.102 NBNS Name query response NE 5461 612.88506' Cisco-Li_a9:b5:eb Broadcast ARP Who has 192.168.1.2007 5462 613.02826 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.245 SNMP get-next-request	ISTAT
5461 612.88506' Cisco-Li a9:b5:eb Broadcast ARP Who has 192.168.1.200? 5462 613.02826' 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.245 SNMP get-next-request	STAT
5462 613.02826 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.245 SNMP get-next-request	Tell
	1
5463 613.03054+192.168.1.245 192.168.1.102 SNMP get-response	
5464 613.73557 192.168.1.4 192.168.1.102 synerg 24800 > 1168 [PSH, ACK] Seq=:
5465 613.73678 192.168.1.102 192.168.1.4 synerg 1168 > 24800 [PSH, ACK] Seq=:
5400 013.73732 192.108.1.4 192.108.1.102 Synery 24800 > 1108 [PSH, ACK	J Seq=
1 3407 013.73733.132.108.1.102 132.108.1.4 Synery 1108 > 24800 [PSH, ACK	j sey=.
K	>
🕞 Frame 1 (46 bytes on wire, 46 bytes captured)	
Ethernet II, Src: AsustekC_24:50:9e (00:0e:a6:24:50:9e), Dst: LinksysG_d8:68:b5 (0)	0:0c:4
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.1.102 (192.168.1.102), Dst: 192.168.1.245 (192.168)	3.1.245 💊
<	(>)
0000 00 0c 41 d8 68 b5 00 0e a6 24 50 9e 08 00 45 00	
0010 00 20 6d 9c 00 00 40 01 88 95 c0 a8 01 66 c0 a8 . m@f.	
0020 01 f5 08 00 cf bf 28 0e 4e 39 b8 e6 f9 11(. N9	
G, SnapFiles	
File: "C:\DOCUME~1\VAIO\LOCALS~1\Temp\etherXXXIPAAJT" 1183 KB P: 6802 D: 6802 M: 0 Drops: 0	

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Sniffing Tool: vxSniffer

vxSniffer is a complete network monitoring tool for Windows CE-based devices

It operates on all handheld 2000 HPCs, pocket PCs, Pocket PC 2002s, and Windows Mobile 2003s

It requires an Ethernet adapter with an NDIS-compatible driver

vxSniffer is a licensed software

🔊 v	xSniffer	🕂 🐳 12:22	
Туре	Src IP	Dest IP	-
UDP	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.255	
UDP	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.255	T
UDP	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.255	
UDP	192.168.1.102	192.168,1.255	
UDP	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.255	
UDP	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.255	
UDP	192.168.1.102	192,168,1,255	
UDP	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.255	
IGMP	192.168.1.1	224,0.0.1	
IGMP	192.168.1.112	239.255.25	"
IGMP	192.168.1.1	224.0.0.2	
UDP	192.168.1.111	192.168.1.255	133
VDD	192 168 1 102	192 168 1 111	1



🎊 vxSniffer			12:21	8
Seq#: 49 Packet	Size:	42	Time	-
Ethernet Header:				
000c4176018d ->	01005	ie00	0001	
Type: 0800 (IP)				
IP Header:				
192.168.1.1 ->	224.0.	0.1		22
Protcol: 2 (IGM	P)			177
Length: 28				
IGMP Message:				
Type: 1 (Query)				
Checksum: ee9b				
Group Addr: 0.0	.0.0			
Packet Bytes				•
4 11			•	
			-	N L
Trace Detail				
File 📗 🌆 📥 🚽	· · · ·		U	
			182	7797 C

Source: http://www.cam.com/vxSniffer.html

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Sniffing Tool: Etherpeg

Etherpeg watches the local network for traffic, reassembles out-of-order TCP streams, and scans the result for data that looks like a GIF or JPEG

It is a simple but effective hack that indiscriminately shows all image data that it can assemble

The source code is freely available and compiles easily with a simple make from the terminal window



Source: http://www.etherpeg.org/









Sniffing Tool: Drifnet

Drifnet is based on the lines of EtherPEG

It is a program that listens to network traffic and picks out images from TCP streams it observes

In the beta version, driftnet picks out MPEG audio streams from network traffic and tries to play them









Sniffing Tool: AirMagnet

AirMagnet v1.2 is a new tool from AirMagnet

It is similar to MiniStumbler, except it has a GPS option

This tool is used not only for sniffing out wireless networks, but for the deployment and administration of WLANs in organizations

It uses many levels of graphics and animations to display real-time statistics of WLANs in the area

It not only displays the unsecured networks, but also gives a list of possible security holes and configuration problems with WLANs in the area



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AirMagnet: Screenshot

(d8m) Ele View Jools Help (_) (n) (x) AirMagnet LiveCapture [My Profile] R AP with WEP disabled (M) V AL Ą1 Security: Urgent CH. \$04 Alam Time. AP with WEP disabled 6 0000 [4/17 18:05:22 - 4/17 18:05:22] £. 000 AP unconfigured AP 00.06/25/55 CB 54 has to WEP encryption disabled. If higher level encryption mechanism such as VFN is not used, data exchange between 3:00 Open authentication used this AP and its client stations is subject to eavesdropping by intruders. In-Client with WEP disabled 4/17/18:24:45 00.0 addition, unauthorized clients without encryption keys can associate with this AP and consume its resources. **Channel** 5 Sro Node 00:06:25:55:08:54 Dat Node IN/A) 3 6 A Security Performance Signal Strength Total Total % -A 0 0.2 99 % 19374 0 0% 49 62 0 0% 1699819 99.25 0 02 5296 02 A Aleri 0 E BY Frames/Bytes 19914 1705115 -60 + Gel Chil Franzis/Robert 8 272 Y 00:06:25:55:06:54 linksys. 87 3 ¢, Scan 6. III Start Channel 22 Infrastructure 🗖 Decodes \, 😪 🛸 AirWISE "Charts

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Sniffing Tool: WinDump

WinDump is the porting to the Windows platform of tcpdump; the most used network sniffer/analyzer for UNIX

It is fully compatible with tcpdump and can be used to watch and diagnose network traffic according to various complex rules



C = `	\scan>windump −i	1 -qnt dst	host 192.168	.4.3 and not j	port 8080 and	l proto UDP
wi	ndump: listening	on \Device\	NPF_{DEB64C0	5-DEE8-4B4B-87	783–2C3FE6BA8	47F>
IΡ	192.168.4.15.277	0 > 192.168	.4.3.514: ud	p 118		
IΡ	192.168.4.15.277	75 > 192.168	.4.3.514: ud	p 114		
IΡ	192.168.4.15.277	6 > 192.168	.4.3.514: ud	p 161		
IΡ	192.168.4.15.278	4 > 192.168	.4.3.514: ud	p 114		
IΡ	192.168.4.15.278	5 > 192.168	.4.3.514: ud	p 162		
IΡ	192.168.4.15.278	6 > 192.168	.4.3.514: ud	p 160		
I P	192.168.4.15.278	8 > 192.168	.4.3.514: ud	p 116		
IΡ	192.168.4.15.279	8 > 192.168	.4.3.514: ud	p 114		



WinDump: Screenshot

Auto 💽 🛄 🖻 🔂 🚰 🏧 🗛
E:\test>WinDump.exe -h E:\TEST\WINDUMP.EXE version 2.02, based on TCPdump version 3.4a6 libpcap for Windows version 2.02, based on libpcap version 0.4a6 Usage: E:\TEST\WINDUMP.EXE [-adDef1nNOpPqStvx] [-B size] [-c count] [-E driver_ requests]
[-F file] [-i interface] [-r file] [-s snaplen] [-T type] [-w file] [expression]
E:\test>windump E:\TEST\WINDUMP.EXE: listening on PPPMAC
18:18:23.779656 ip-20.dialup.dux.ru.1051 > clusterb.icq.com.80: S 71369136:71369 136(0) win 8760 <mss 536,nop,nop,sackok=""> (DF)</mss>
18:18:23.794251 ip=20.dialup.dux.ru.1052 > cache.dux.ru.53: 1+ (45) 18:18:23.816884 clusterb.icq.com.80 > ip=20.dialup.dux.ru.1043: R 1877700023:187 7700022(0) win (5292 (DP)
18:18:23.844128 clusterb.icg.com.80 > ip-20.dialup.dux.ru.1044: R 2415370996:241 5370996(0) win 65392 (DF)
18:18:23.857039 clusterb.icq.com.80 > ip-20.dialup.dux.ru.1046: R 992010446:9920 10446(0) win 65392 (DF)
18:18:23.864846 clusterb.icq.com.80 > ip-20.dialup.dux.ru.1045: R 1878130955:187 8130955(0) win 65392 (DF)
18:18:23.889606 ads.web.aol.com.80 > ip-20.dialup.dux.ru.1041: R 1550904322:1550 904322(0) win 0 (DF) 18:18:24.0604_

Multiuse Tool: THC-RUT

THC-RU gathers information from local and remote networks

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It offers a wide range of network discovery tools: arp lookup on an IP range, spoofed DHCP request, RARP, BOOTP, ICMPping, ICMP address mask request, OS fingerprintings, and high-speed host discovery

THC-RUT comes with a new OS fingerprint implementation

🥝 (Eterm-0.9) oox
segfault:"/.tmp/thcrut-1.2/src# ./thcrut dhcp -h usage: dhcp [options] [IP] 255.255.255.255 is used if no ip is supplied. -1 Hosts in parallel (10)	÷.
-s <ip> source IP (0,0,0,0) -v vebose</ip>	184
-m <mac> source mac (random: 00:01:08:82:11:04) -D <val1[,val2]> DHCP option, 0=List DHCP options seofault:"/ tmp/therut-1 2/src# /therut dhen</val1[,val2]></mac>	
BOOTP reply from 62.67.57.4 -> 62.67.57.53 Server : 62.67.57.4	
Client : 62.67.57.53 Relay Agent : 0.0.0.0	
ServerName I BootFile I pxelinux.0 MAC I 00:01:08:82:11:04	
DHCP Message Type: 02 Server Identifier: 62,67,57,4	
IP Address Lease Time: 10 minutes Subnet Mask: 255.255.255.0	
Router: 62.67.57.1 Domain Name Server: 80.190.48.280.190.49.2 Domain Name: xtserver.net	
Broadcast Address: 62.67.57.255 segfault:~/.tmp/thcrut-1.2/src#	

Source: *http://www.thc.org/thc-rut/*

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WinPcap is a free public system for direct network access under Windows

Most networking applications access the network through widely used system primitives, such as sockets

This approach allows easy transfer of data on a network, because the OS copes with low-level details (protocol handling, flow reassembly, and so on) and provides an interface similar to the one used to read and write on a file

WinPcap can be used by different kind of tools for network analysis, troubleshooting, security, and monitoring





Source: http://winpcap.mirror.WireShark.com/

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AirPcap enables troubleshooting tools like Wireshark (formerly WireShark) and WinDump to provide information about the wireless protocols and radio signals

It is the first open, affordable, and easy to deploy WLAN (802.11b/g) packet capture solution for the Windows platform

It comes as a USB 2.0 adapter, and it has been fully integrated with WinPcap and Wireshark

It enables you to capture and analyze:

- 802.11b/g wireless traffic
- Control frames
- Management frames
- Power information



Source: *http://www.cacetech.com/*





Features:

- Complete visibility on your wireless networks
- Portable and versatile
- Easy to set up
- Easy to use
- The performance you need
- Ready to power your application







AirPcap: Screenshot 1

AirPcap Co	ntrol Panel			
iterface				
AirPcap USB	wireless capture adapte	r nr. 00	×	Blink Led
asic Configur	ation			
Channel	6	Include	802.11 FCS in	Frames
Capture Type	802.11 + Radio 💌	FCS Filter	Valid Packet	s 💌
1234abcdef			F	lemove Key
abcdef1234 1234abcdef				lemove Key
			1	E DIV
				Edit Key
				Edit Key love Key Up we Key Down
			Ma	Edit Key love Key Up we Key Down
				Edit Key love Key Up we Key Down Help

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AirPcap: Screenshot 2

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Multiple AirPcap Adapters in Wireshark



AirPcap: Screenshot 3

Untitled) - Wireshark		
Ele Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Help		
■■■■■■□□×♀□□■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■	X E	1
Elter: Expression Clear Apply		
Lurrent Wireless Interface: # 01 802.11 Channel: 6 💌 FCS Filter: All Frames 🔹 🔛 Advanced Wireless Settings		
No Size Time Source Destination Protocol Info	power	Rate
23 203 1.152250 03:14:92:33:85:05 f7:a8:86+07:b1:1 IEEE 802.11 Data, 51=3808, FN=10 24 28 1 153357 Formation 01:6a:1 IEEE 802.11 Acknowledgement	31 dB 28 dB	48.0 24.0
25 Change fre adapter s Sector fre adapter for adapte	28 dB CE" 28 dB CE" 27 dB CE" 27 dB	1.0 1.0 1.0
29 103 1.324436 C15Co-L1_6a:29:58 D-L1nk_8d:27:04 IEEE 802.11 Probe Response, SN=950, FN=0, BI=100, SSID: CAM 30 103 1.327311 Cisco-Li_6a:29:58 D-Link_8d:2f:d4 IEEE 802.11 Probe Response, SN=950, FN=0, BI=100, SSID: "CAM 31 109 1.332805 Cisco-Li_6a:29:58 D-Link_8d:2f:d4 IEEE 802.11 Bracon frame, SN=951, FN=0, BI=100, SSID: "CAC 32 103 1.333804 Cisco-Li_6a:29:58 D-Link_8d:2f:d4 IEEE 802.11 Probe Response, SN=950, FN=0, BI=100, SSID: "CAC	CE" 28 dB " 27 dB CE" 27 dB	1.0 1.0 1.0
<pre>Frame 25 (109 bytes on wire, 109 bytes captured) Radiotap Header v0, Length 24 FIEEE 802.11 FIEEE 802.11 wireless LAN management frame Fixed parameters (12 bytes) Timestamp: 0x00000027D0300188 Beacon Interval: 0.102400 [Seconds]</pre>		
Tagged parameters (45 bytes)		
000 00 00 18 00 8e 58 00 00 10 02 9e 09 a0 00 58 00 x. x. x. 0010 00 1c 00 00 de 6b 2c 80 00 00 00 ff f		
eacon Interval (wlan_mgt.fi P: 60 D: 60 M: 0 Drops: 0		



		less Settings	Advanced Wire
Blink Led	adapter nr. 01	AirPcap USB wirele	Interface
			Basic Parameters
	Include 802.11 FCS in Frames	6	Channel:
•	FCS Filter: All Frames	802.11 + Radio	Capture Type:
Add New Key	A	yption	 Enable WEP Decr abcdef1234
Remove Key	F		1234abcdef
Edit Key			
Move Key Up	M		
ove Key Down	Mo		1
	Ma Ok		

CEH AirPcap: Example Program from the Developer's Pack

_ 🗆 🗙 C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe Channel frequency: 2452 MHz Channel number: 9 Channel type: 802.11b, 2Ghz spectrum Signal Quality: 28 antenna n. Ø Signal Strength: 71dB Frame Check Seguence: 0xa0c2e5fc Packet length - captured portion: 81, 81 Rate: 1.0 Mb/s Channel frequency: 2452 MHz Channel number: 9 Channel type: 802.11b, 2Ghz spectrum Signal Quality: 92 antenna n. Ø Signal Strength: 73dB Frame Check Sequence: 0xb04f9b12 Packet length - captured portion: 81, 81 Rate: 1.0 Mb/s Channel frequency: 2452 MHz Channel number: 9 Channel type: 802.11b, 2Ghz spectrum Signal Quality: 100 antenna n. Ø Signal Strength: 72dB Frame Check Sequence: 0x3e671f4 00000000 : 40 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 90 4b 45 36 62 C.....KE6b

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Wireless (802.11) capturing and monitor mode on Vista – with supported hardware, (Native WIFI)

It troubleshoots wireless connections

It can trace wireless management packets

It scans all channels or a subset of the ones your wireless NIC supports

RAS tracing support on Vista

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Microsoft Network Monitor: EH Screenshot

🗭 Microsoft Network Monitor	r 3.1
File Edit View Frames C	Capture Filter Tools Help
00 🖸 🖻 🛃 🐰	눹 📄 ổ 🚱 🕨 💷 🔒 💭 💭 🗣 🖡 🎓 Webw Do I 🗸
😻 Capture1 🏠 Start Page 🧾	Parsers
Network Conversations ×	Select Networks ×
All Traffic	Properties P-Mode
Other Traffic	Friendly Name Description IPv4 A IP Hardware Address Medi
	WAN Miniport Dialup Connection None None 7C-05-20-52-41-53 PPP
	🛛 🗹 Local Area Connection AMD PCNET Family PCI Ethernet Adapter - Packet Scheduler Miniport 10.0.0.30 None 00-0C-29-A1-92-D0 Ethernet
	K
	😋 Capture Filter 🚱 Display Filter 🥞 Select Networks 🗟 Aliases
	Frame Summary ×
	Frame Number Time Offset Conv Id Source Destination Protocol Name Description
	Capture File: C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Local Settings\Temp\capB.tmp
	1 0.000000 NetmonFilter NetmonFilter: Updated Capture Filter: None 2 0.000000 Network/InferExy, Network InferExy, Networ
	3 0.000000 10.0.0.30 10.0.0.1 ARP ARP: Request, 10.0.0.30 asks for 10.0.0.1
	4 5.291016 10.0.0.30 10.0.0.1 ARP ARP: Request, 10.0.0.30 asks for 10.0.0.1
	5 10.788086 10.0.0.30 10.0.0.1 ARP ARP: Request, 10.0.0.30 asks for 10.0.0.1
	Frame Details × Hex Details ×
	- Frame:
	Ethernet: Etype = ARP
	DestinationAddress: *BROADCAST DO12 06 04 00 01 00 00 29 A1 92);□
	⊕ SourceAddress: VMware, Inc. A192D0
	EthernetType: ARP, 2054(0x806)
	🖻 Arp: Request, 10.0.0.30 asks for 10.0.0.1
	HardwareType: Ethernet
Version 3.1.512.0 Di	Displayed: 6 Captured: 6 Sel Frame: 4 (Tot: 1) Prot Off: 0 (0x00) Frame Off: 0 (0x00) Sel Bytes: 42

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Hacking Wireless Networks

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An attacker would first use NetStumbler to drive around and map out active wireless networks

Using Netstumbler, the attacker locates a strong signal on the target WLAN

Netstumbler not only has the ability to monitor all active networks in the area, but it also integrates with a GPS to map APs









At this point, the attacker has chosen his target

NetStumbler or Kismet can tell him whether or not the network is encrypted







Step 3: Analyzing the Network

Example:

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Hacker

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- WLAN has no broadcasted SSID
- NetStubmler tells you that SSID is ZXECCOUNCIL
- Multiple access points are present
- Open authentication method
- WLAN is encrypted with 40bit WEP
- WLAN is not using 802.1X







Step 4: Cracking the WEP Key

Attacker sets NIC drivers to monitor mode

It begins by capturing packets with Airodump

Airodump quickly lists the available network with SSID and starts capturing packets

After a few hours of Airodump session, launch Aircrack to start cracking!

WEP key for ZXECCOUNCIL is now revealed!





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Look for plaintext protocols (in this case, FTP, POP, and Telnet)



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Wireless Security

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WIDZ: Wireless Intrusion Detection System

WIDZ is a proof of concept IDS system for 802.11 that guards APs and monitors locally for potentially malevolent activity

It detects scans, association floods, and bogus/rogue APs. It can easily be integrated with SNORT or RealSecure



Radius: Used as Additional Layer in Security



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Securing Wireless Networks

MAC Address Filtering

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• MAC Address Filtering method uses a list of MAC addresses of client wireless network interface cards that are allowed to associate with the access point

SSID (NetworkID)

- The first attempt to secure a wireless network was the use of Network ID (SSID)
- When a wireless client wants to associate with an access point, the SSID is transmitted during the process
- The SSID is a seven-digit alphanumeric ID that is hard coded into the access point and the client device

Firewalls

• Using a firewall to secure a wireless network is probably the only way to prevent unauthorized access

Wireless networks that use infrared beams to transport data from one point to another are secure





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Securing Wireless Networks (cont'd)

Change the default SSID names, such as NETGEAR

Add passwords to all devices on the wireless network

Disable broadcasting on network access points

Do not give the network a name that identifies your company, like EC-Council-NYC

Move wireless access points away from windows

Disable DHCP and use manual IP addresses

Do not allow remote management of access points





Securing Wireless Networks (cont'd)

Use the built-in encryption at the access point

Disable the features you do not use such as printing and music support in the AP

Upgrade your firmware regularly

Put a firewall between the wireless network and other company computers on the network

Encrypt data at the application protocol, for example, SSL

Change all default settings for access points:

• Such as the IP address

Regularly test wireless network security

Include VPN in your wireless security solutions





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Wireless Network Security Checklist

- ✓ Ensure that all unused ports are closed
 - \checkmark Any open ports must be justified
 - ✓ "Pessimistic" network view
- Enforce the rule of least access
- ✓ Ensure SSIDs are changed regularly
- Ensure insurance and authentication standards are created and enforced
- ✓ Use strong encryption
 - ✓ SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm)
- ✓ Initiate encryption at user and end at server that is behind the firewall, outside the DMZ
- Treat WLANs as untrusted networks that must operate inside the DMZ



Wireless Network Security Checklist (cont'd)

- ✓ Access trusted network via VPN and two-factor authentication
- ✓ Increase application security:
 - $\checkmark\,$ Possibly through use of an enterprise application system
 - ✓ Minimally through increased encryption
- ✓ Do not allow ad hoc WLANS
- ✓ Embrace and employ the 802.11i IEEE security standard
 - $\checkmark\,$ Native per user access control
 - $\checkmark\,$ Native strong authentication (tokens, smartcards, and certificates)
 - $\checkmark\,$ Native strong encryption



WLAN Security: Passphrase

A passphrase is a sequence of words or other text used to control access to a computer system, program, or data



It is similar to a password in usage, but is generally longer for added security

Passphrases are often used to control both access to, and operation of, cryptographic programs and systems

Passphrases are particularly applicable to systems that use the passphrase as an encryption key









Wireless Security Tools

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WLAN Diagnostic Tool: CommView for WiFi PPC

CommView for WiFi PPC is a special lightweight edition of CommView for WiFi that runs on Pocket PC handheld computers

It is a WLAN diagnostic solution designed for express wireless site surveys, as well as capturing and analyzing network packets on wireless 802.11b/g networks

It gathers information from the wireless adapter and decodes the analyzed data

With CommView for WiFi PPC, you can:

- Scan the air for WiFi signals
- Select channels for monitoring
- Detect access points and wireless stations
- Capture packets
- Measure signal strength
- View the list of network connections
- Examine and filter individual packets

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CommView for WiFi PPC: Screenshots



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ह Cor	nm¥iew	3
Proto	Address	-
IP/UDP	192,168.0,102=>239,255,255,250	
IP/UDP	192,168.0,102=>239,255,255,250	≡
IP/UDP	192,168.0,102=>239,255,255,250	
IP/UDP	192,168.0,102=>239,255,255,250	
IP/UDP	192,168.0,102=>239,255,255,250	
M/PRB	00:11:95:BE:C2:D3=>Broadcast	
M/PRB	00:11:95:BE:C2:D3=>Broadcast	
M/PRB	00:11:95:BE:C2:D3=>Broadcast	
M/PRB	00:0D:88:17:0A:B8=>00:11:95:BE:C2:0	•
•	III 🕨	
	Ic	lle
File Sta	ats Packets RulesHelp 🖽	•

CommView for WiFi PPC: Screenshots

🎊 Comm¥iew	- €x =(€ 5:34) 🐽
- General ————	
Beset data after ea	ach cycle
Capture data while	scanning
Hide wired hosts	
Seconds per channel	
-Sound	
Play sound when a	new &P or
802.11b 🔻	✓1
	7 2
Check/Uncheck All	7 3 1
Scap Capture Settings	Drivers Aliases
Sear Captare Sectings	

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<i>8</i> 7 c	lomm¥ie	w	-∜x ◄	€ 5:35	ⓓ
 Allow capture Beacons Management packets Control packets Data packets 					
C 6 Key	ecode W 4bit () 1 1	(EP) 1.28 bit [] 0] Ignore	CRC e	rr.
Suspend packet output					
Auto E	o save p nable	ackets –		Clear	
Scan	Capture	Settings	Drivers	Aliases	
				E	ਾ



Handheld Analyzer is a convenient and inexpensive way to solve serious problems in the enterprise wireless LAN

It is used for troubleshooting of 802.11 b LANs

Features:

- Automatically detects vulnerabilities
- Locks down security policies
- Performs live, interactive network tests
- Tracks down rogues and devices
- Detailed packet and frame analysis
- Accesses the AirWISE® expert
- GPS support
- Flexible mobile form factor

AirMagnet Handheld Analyzer: Screenshot 1 CEH



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TM

Ethical

AirMagnet Handheld Analyzer: Screenshot 2



TM

Ethical Hacker

- e e		1000	
STA:	Agere:2E:57:08 -		
AP:	Aironet:29:4F:46 -airpocket	- @	
STA C	onnection Diagnosis	Status	
Beaco	n received	Yes(1)	
Probe	request sent	Yes(5)	
Probe	response received	Yes(1)	
Auth.	request sent	Yes(1)	
Auth.	challenge received	3	
Auth.	challenge response received	4	
Auth.	Yes(1)		
Assoc	Yes(1)		
Assoc	iation response received	Yes(1)	
Data 1	TX: IP ARP	Yes(61)	
Data I	Yes(30)		
	a service of the second of second s	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	

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Auditing Tool: BSD-Airtools

BSD-Airtools is a package that provides a complete toolset for wireless 802.11b auditing

It contains a bsd-based WEPCracking application, called dweputils, as well as kernel patches for NetBSD, OpenBSD, and FreeBSD

It also contains a curses-based AP detection application similar to NetStumbler (dstumbler) that can be used to detect wireless access points and connected nodes, view signal to noise graphs, and interactively scroll through scanned APs and view statistics for each

It also includes other tools to provide a complete toolset for making use of all 14 of the prism2 debug modes as well as do basic analysis of the hardware-based link-layer protocols provided by prism2's monitor debug mode

Source: http://www.dachb0den.com/

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Ethical





AirDefense Guard is an 802.11a/b/g wireless LAN intrusion detection and security solution that identifies security risks and attacks, provides real-time network audits, and monitors the health of the wireless LAN

It detects all rogue WLANs

It secures a wireless LAN by recognizing and responding to intruders and attacks as they happen

It performs real-time network audits to inventory all hardware, tracks all wireless LAN activity, and enforces WLAN policies for security and management

It monitors the health of the network to identify and respond to hardware failures, network interferences, and performance degradation

Source: www.AirDefense.com

AirDefense Guard: Screenshot



		Critical	Major	Minor	Ignore	Total
	Today	0	0	0	0	0
>	Yesterday	0	0	0	0	0
	All	0	0	0	0	0

PERSONAL

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Preferences

Help

Ethical Hacker





Google Secure Access is a downloadable client application that allows users to establish a more secure WiFi connection

It connects to Google's VPN ("Virtual Private Network")

It encrypts your Internet traffic and sends it through Google's servers to the Internet. The data that is received will then be encrypted and sent back through Google's servers to your computer







Tool: RogueScanner

RogueScanner is a network security tool for automatically discovering rogue wireless access points by scanning a wired network

It can also be used for network asset discovery

It can find all network connected devices like printers, routers, web cameras, and PCs

Statistics 195 Add 95 Dev	esses Scanned ices Found	Scarning Status 10 Threads Active 558 Pending Probes	Need Better Classific: Scan larger networks with a rogue devices, and view gr	ation? nproved accuracy, block aphical reports Learn More		
IP Address	MAC Address	Vendor Mo	del Score	Class	Feedback	
192,168,1,1	00E0FC07658D	/ Hot digypline ptt				
192,168,1,231	08.05.5D.2F.19.E3	No denimo de				
192.168.1.31	00.11:2F.7B:A7.CB	74x0 x52220002.pol				
192.168.1.3	00.0255.07.8A.AB	Not classified july				
192.168.1.4	00.40.95.CO.05.47	Fild stassiled put				
192,168,1,39	00.60 E0.80.34:08	. Net Digethind and				
192,168,1,240	00.05/5D/2F 19 F8	Net Observing of				
192.168.1.76	00:0C:6E:6A:D1:43	1 Not classified pai				
192,168,1.233	00.02.55.07.30.30	Not classified pol				
192,168,1,253	00.0255.07.2252	Not characted pit				
192.168.1.23	00.02.55.07.B1 AD	Not charmed yet				
192.168.1.184	00.10.5A:5C:39.1F	Not classified part				
192.168.1.230	00.0C:6E:7A:F2:49	Nitt thes illed price				
192,168,1.8	00.40.95.30.86.7C	Not blatched ask				
192,168,1.9	00.04 60.01:7B:31					
192.168.1.10	00:0E:53:03:FF:34	, Nett i Lexabled per				
192,169,1.11	00.0E:53:04:06:24	Not signified you				
192.168.1.13	00.08:AC:EA:75:C0	 Nut obtained path 				
192,168,1.14	00 E0 4C B0 62 EA	Not chastled pit				
192.168.1.15	00.04 75 FC:33 75	Not databas you				
192.168.1.17	00.40.95 30.96.70	thit claudeo pH				
192.168.1.22	00.05 5D 35 A8 03	flen etarnheet per				
192 168 1.27	00.40.95 30.82.68	Not examined put				
192,168 1,32	00.05 5D 35 80.74	Not classified part				
192.168.1.33	00.00.58:15:94:26	Plan Magazified and				
192,168,1.34	00.0D-67-0E:A5-6E	Nut o'stated pit				
192,168,1.35	00 50 FC 54 56 9C	Net chronities pol				
192.168.1.36	00 50 FC 64 66 A9	Not when all we want				
192.168.1.195	00E04CECA1:09	i Not classified yok				
192.168.1.182	00E040E08388	Non-characterizati				
192,168 1.41	00.06.58:15.AC.D1	Net cleasting at				
192,158.1.42	00.00.6E EA:D1:0D	Part (Internet of a				
192,168,1,44	00 E0 4C EE 04 56	Ran classified sol				



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A wireless network enables a mobile user to connect to a LAN through a wireless (radio) connection

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is designed to provide a WLAN with a level of security and privacy comparable to what is usually expected of a wired LAN

It is vulnerable because of relatively short IVs and keys that remain static

Even if WEP is enabled, an attacker can easily sniff MAC addresses as they appear in the clear format. Spoofing MAC addresses is also easy

Wireless networks are vulnerable to DoS attacks

Wireless network security can adopt a suitable strategy of MAC address filtering, firewalling, or a combination of protocol-based measures

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"This phone won't disturb anyone at the movies. It has a ringer that sounds like people eating popcorn!"





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"It's an internet-ready, tri-mode, LCD color, MP3 compatible, digital wireless communicator. We make them extra big so people will notice how cool you are."



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"Watch where you're going, Larry — you walked right through my wireless data stream!"